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A serious deficiency in the current discourse onjihad involves the failure
to adequately evaluate competing jurisdictional claims over lawful violence,
specifically warfare. While limitations and guidelines in armed conflict arefrequently discussed, there is rarely any mention ofwho can legitimately regulate
Islamic law's duty to fight. This duty emerged shortly after Islam's founding in
the 7th century A.D. and was a collective one (fard ki22ya), meant to support the
state's war efforts in the absence of standing armies. The duty was regulated by
the state and responsibility for it was shared across society: if at least some
people performed, then the obligation was satisfied for everyone else. However,
colonial rule and the advent of weak post-colonial states contributed to
circumstances that transformed the duty into an individual obligation (fard
cayn); required of every person with legal capacity and not subject to state
oversight.
This Article makes a number of contributions. First, it utilizes pre-
modern historical sources to construct a detailed understanding of how the duty
to fight functioned in classical Islamic law. Second, it reveals how a variety of
factors caused jihad to shift from a collective to individual duty and the impact
this has on state jurisdiction over violence. Third, it provides a new reading of
colonial resistance, suggesting a predilection for statist frameworks among
actors engaged in anti-colonial jihad. Finally, the Article analyzes a pivotal
20th-century fatwd (advisory legal opinion) that reframed the classical jihad-
duty, making it a perpetual obligation required of all Muslims. The Article
contends that this reframing led to the state losing oversight over jihad and
lawful violence, contributed to the militancy of non-state actors and created
distorting effects in Islamic law's interpretation and application, with
consequences that continue to manifest.
I. INTRODUCTION
During a famous speech in the late 1980s, entitled "Jihad in
Afghanistan," cAbdallah Yiisuf eAzzim, considered by many the intellectual
forefather of Al-Qaeda, argued that "if jihad is not [an individual obligation]
(fard cayn) now, it will never be an individual obligation ... !"' His words
carried a powerful message: if you are unwilling to fight in this context, you will
I cAbdallah cAzzilm, Just How Far is Jihad?, YouTUBE, at 1:11-1:14 (Mar. 3, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k3XTPZcLaJc [in Arabic]. I have been unable to find the
location or exact date this speech was given. It likely occurred between 1984 and 1989, the period
when cAzzam traveled around the globe giving speeches on the Afghan jihid. It should be noted
that cAzzim had no formal link to al-Qaeda as it did not exist in his lifetime, and, as Darryl Li has
convincingly shown, there is no evidence to suggest that it was even being contemplated. The term
al-qacida does appear in an article by cAzzam, but is used in a general sense. See Darryl Li, "Afghan




never be ready to fight. cAzzdm spoke at the height of Soviet aggression against
Afghanistan (1979-89).2 He claimed "broad consensus" among everyone, from
exegetes to jurists, that "if [disbelievers] approach an inch ... towards the land
of [] Muslims, [then] jihad becomes [an individual obligation] upon every
Muslim[.]" 3 This obligation, he clarified, extends beyond the inhabitants of
Afghanistan and applies to Muslims "all over the world"; in fact, it was surpassed
in importance only by belief in God and the Prophet Muhammad.4 cAzzam
spread this message across the globe from 1984 until his death in 1989.5 By that
stage, he is reported to have recruited between 16,000 and 20,000 men, from 20
different countries, to fight in Afghanistan. 6 His speech illustrates the stark
transformation of Islamic law's duty to fight (or jihad-duty) during the 20th
century.7 New understandings of who possessed authority to regulate the jihad-
duty reflected changes in socio-political circumstances in the Muslim world-
with profound consequences for conceptualizing Islamic law.
Ever since September 11, 2001, government officials and pundits,
academics and policy experts, have dissected jihad in an effort to make sense of
growing religious militancy.8 Unfortunately, this wealth of scholarship and
commentary consistently neglects the nature ofjihad as a legal duty. Islamic law
has two forms of legal duties: collective and individual. Collective duties (fard
kif22ya) are required acts that can be satisfied by the performance of one person
or a group of people. Individual duties (fard cayn) are obligations that everyone
is required to perform. The duty to fight, orjihad-duty, originated as a collective
duty, but in the past few decades became individually obligated, according to
many prominent jurists.9 Historically, re-categorizing a collective duty as an
2 See Aryn Baker, Who Killed Abdullah Azzam?, TIME (June 18, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1902809_1902810_1905173-
2,00.html.
3 cAzzim, supra note 1, at 1:31-1:37. Note that cAzzdm's use of the term "disbeliever"
(kufar) here refers to non-Muslims. The same statement is also made in current times by the
"Islamic State" (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Levant, or ISIS/ISIL). See Why
We Hate You and Why We Fight You, 15 DABIQ 30, 32 (July 2016) ("As long as there is an inch of
territory left for us to reclaim, jihad will continue to be a personal obligation on every single
Muslim."). ISIS only uses the Muslim calendar dates, but I have included the approximate
Gregorian date as well. I am grateful to Akbar Hossain for bringing this quote to my attention.
4 cAzzam, supra note 1.
5 Baker, supra note 2.
6 Chris Suellentrop, Abdullah Azzam: The Godfather of Jihad, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2002),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/assessment/2002/04/abdullah_azzam.html.
All dates are C.E. unless otherwise noted.
For a useful short primer on these approaches, see Darryl Li, A Jihadism Anti-Primer, 45
MIDDLE EAST REP. 1, 1 (Fall 2015), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer276/jihadism-anti-primer.
9 While pre-modern jurists generally classified the jihad-duty as collective, there were
specific cases where circumstances temporarily necessitated participation from everyone. For
instance, if an enemy attacked a town, the population of that town was required to participate in its
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individual obligation did occur, but only temporarily. The sole exception is the
modem jihad-duty. It has effectively become a permanent individual
obligation-a change that is unprecedented in Islamic law.
This Article exploresjihad as a legal duty and unpacks the consequences
of this novel shift from collective to individual obligation. Specifically, re-
categorization of the duty has significantly diminished the state's traditional
jurisdiction over violence and warfare, as well as altered the way Islamic legal
interpretation is done. When a collective duty is re-categorized as an individual
obligation, the state's oversight over the duty is theoretically lost. This is because
the duty is no longer a shared responsibility: everyone has to perform.
Unfortunately, as the state's authority decreased in practice, it was also
increasingly ignored in concept. Modem juristic interpretation of substantive law
onjihad routinely fails to account for the state's essential administrative role.'
Part I of this paper provides a brief background on Islamic law, the
concept of jihad, how Islamic legal duties function and the role of the state in
Islamic law and practice. Part II traces the medieval juristic arguments, both
scriptural and non-scriptural, for jihad as a collective duty and uncovers the
structure of authority undergirding the obligation. It examines the details of the
doctrine that developed around the pre-modernjihad-duty in order for the reader
to fully appreciate how militant jurists depart from it. Part III takes a closer look
at how this jurisdiction overjihad functions in Islamic law. It provides an original
examination of the different entities that claim authority overjihad and how they
interact together. Specifically, it outlines the nature of the state's authority over
jihad according to pre-modern jurists. It also discusses the role of status-based
authority in the jihad context. Part IV is a novel legal explanation for some of
the features of jihad-based resistance during the period of colonialism in the
Muslim world. It will examine why colonization served as a catalyst for the
duty's transformation. Part V explores how juristic thinking about the jihad-duty
changed in the late twentieth century from a collective duty to an individual
obligation. It argues that in the process of this change, individuals gained powers
generally reserved for the state, which further weakened the ability of nations
emerging out of colonialism to regulate violence. A pivotal moment in this
change was when militant jurists began issuing legal opinions supporting jihad
as an individual duty. This Part analyzes arguably the most important opinion
defense. The difference in the contemporary period is that many jurists consider defense of Muslim
territory anywhere the duty of Muslims everywhere. I have only found one premodern reference
to such an expansive duty: the 12th century North African jurist Muhammad al-Miziri reports that
there were unnamed pre-modern jurists who also considered jihad individually obligated outside
of exceptional circumstances. 3 SHIHAB AL-DN AL-QARAFT (d. 1285), AL-DHAKHIRA [THE
RESERVOIR] 385 (1994).
10 For a broad survey of these opinions, see generally MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN, MODERN
ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN A RADICAL AGE: RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND INTERNAL CRITICISM (2012);
and, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JIHAD: LAW, SOCIETY AND MILITARY ACTION (Elisabeth Kendall &
Ewan Stein eds., 2015).
430 [Vol. 120
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issued during this period. Part VI discusses the implications of the change in the
jihad-duty and what is necessary to rectify the current state of affairs. It argues
that the current approach to violence by non-state actors engaged in jihad is
flawed because it fails to considerjihad as the performance of a legal duty. More
importantly, by not appreciating how this duty has changed, the policy crafted to
address the problem of religious militancy overlooks how reconstituting the
state's pre-modem role in regulating jihad can delegitimize non-state actors
operating today.
This project is a much-needed examination of an overlooked
development in Islamic law. It investigates how contemporary jurists, namely
cAbdallah cAzzdm, transformed Islamic law's duty to fight from a collective to
an individual obligation. It argues that CAzzam, in an unprecedented move,
changed the conventional view of jihad from a state-authorized collective duty
to an individual obligation under the authority of non-state actors. This is
significant in a number of ways. First, the move decouples the state from the
analysis of Islamic law, leading to a disjuncture between Islamic law in theory
and how it is meant to be administered in practice. Second, it radically transforms
the doctrine of jihad to justify the actions of non-state actors, like al-Qaeda, and
empowers them with an unprecedented authority to regulate violence. Third, it
reorients the classically recognized forms of interpretation in Islamic law to
include approaches that are sui generis and illegitimate according to its own
terms. By understanding the legal discourse surrounding jihad, from medieval
times to today, we will acquire a better appreciation of not only contemporary
thinking on jiha5d, but also its impact on the entire edifice of Islamic law. In the
process, we will arrive at more effective conceptual approaches to addressing
modem religious militancy.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part presents some key ideas about Islamic law, its history, and
current debates. Specifically, it looks at the framework of the Islamic legal
tradition, the nature of collective duties, what jihad means and the debate over a
state's role in Islamic law. The aim is to provide the uninitiated reader with
enough background to appreciate the argument being advanced and the
significance of the legal change that took place within juristic discussions of
Islamic law's duty to fight.
A. Islamic Legal Tradition
The Islamic legal tradition takes shape in the eighth century, shortly after
the religion's founding." Its evolution since then has adapted to different
" See WAEL HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 5 (Wael B. Hallaq ed.,
2005) ("By the end of the second/eighth century, all essential features of the judiciary and positive
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geographies, social contexts and political orders. It has functioned inside and
outside the state, as an official part of the legal system and informally as
essentially customary law.
Islamic law is premised on two key sources of law: a scripture, the
Qur'an, and texts that preserve traditions from the Prophet Muhammad, the
Hadith.1 2 The Qur'an is considered to be God's verbatim message to humanity,
but it is not primarily a legal text; in fact, most of it does not pertain to law at
all. 13 Aside from some explicit verses containing legal injunctions on subjects
like criminal punishment, inheritance and family law, the Qur'an's utility for the
jurist is in the guidelines and principles it contains. 14 The jurist uses these to
create legal rules.15 Most traditions ascribed to Muhammad are also not legal in
nature. However, the corpus of Prophetic traditions is immense, far larger than
the Qur'anic text, and because of the sheer volume of traditions, there are a fair
number relating to law. 1 Collectively, the Qur'an and these Prophetic traditions
are known as Sharfa. " However, in common parlance, Sharfa has also come to
encompass the positive law that jurists derived from these sources.' 8 Much of the
corpus of Islamic law was a result of examining these sources, extracting legal
injunctions from them, reconciling potential conflict between them and
constructing additional rules from the implicit principles they contain.
The task of derivation was left to qualified jurists functioning inside and
outside of the state apparatus. Those on the outside were jurists that operated in
their private capacity and historically became the "locus of legal expertise" and
authority. 19 Their motivation to study the law was "largely a matter of piety"
driven by the need to articulate law that would "deal with all the problems of
society."20 It was also a scholastic activity that involved intellectual play.
legal doctrine had clearly acquired a highly developed form .... ); 41 HARALD MOTZKI, THE
ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: MECCAN FIQH BEFORE THE CLASSICAL SCHOOLS xiv-xV
(Wadad Kadi ed., Marion H. Katz trans., 2002); INTISAR A. RABB, DOUBT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A
HISTORY OF LEGAL MAXIMS, INTERPRETATION, AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW 8-15 (2015); AHMED
EL SHAMSY, THE CANONIZATION OF ISLAMIC LAW: A SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 2-3
(2013).
12 See 30 JOSEPH E. LOWRY, EARLY ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY: THE RISALA OF MUHAMMAD IBN
IDRIS AL-SHAFIq 8-9 (Bernard Weiss et al. eds., 2007).
13 Id. at 207 ("The Qur'in is not for the most part legislative in nature .....
14 See id. at 211.
15 See HALLAQ, supra note 11, at 63-68.
16 See id. at 69.
17 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Islamic Law - The Shariah, MIDDLE EAST INST. (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.mei.edu/content/islamic-law-shariah.
18 Rudolph Peters, From Jurists' Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari'a is
Codified, in SHAPING THE CURRENT ISLAMIC REFORMATION 81, 83 (B.A. Roberson ed., 2003).




Eventually, jurists coalesced into different schools of thought, each committed
to slightly different methodological approaches to the derivation of law.2 ' The
rulings that were produced out of these schools represented the "fruits of source-
critical methods to address issues of textual authenticity and reliability"; they
also had "precedential value."2 2 However, as this Article will demonstrate, jurists
have never been the "exclusive interpreters" of Islamic law, as some claim.23
Public officials, including judges, rulers and administrators, have also played an
important role in the interpretive process, especially because they gave meaning
to legal rules by defining how they were applied. Application of legal rules
inevitably contributes to the interpretation of Islamic law because it adjusts the
law to better fit the circumstances. Furthermore, while in theory only jurists were
involved in law making, in practice this was not always the case.24 In fact, an
"interesting discrepancy" exists in the "early Islamic empires between law
making and the perception of law making."2 5 Specifically, in relation to public
law, the state routinely "determined the rules and regulations in several areas of
the law . ... 26
B. Legal Duties: Collective (kifaya) and Individual (ayn)
There are various ways to divide up the rules of Islamic law into
conceptual rubrics. One such rubric that potentially encompasses all Islamic
positive law depends on the distinction between individual and collective
obligations. In general, obligatory acts are understood as acts that every Muslim
must fulfill: technically known as "individual obligations" (fard cayn). The most
common examples are prayer, paying an annual charitable tax and pilgrimage.
Although these individual obligations may be classified as "religious," pre-
modem works on Islamic law also discuss other legal subjects that might be
classified as "secular." 2 7 In this vein, another type of obligatory act, often not
21 See generally Intisar A. Rabb, "We the Jurists": Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 527, 546 (2008) (explaining the formation of regional circles of schools devoted
to the study of Islamic law).
22 Id.
23 See generally Aharon Layish, Islamic Law in the Modern World: Nationalization,
Islamization, Reinstatement, 21 ISLAMIC L. & Soc'Y 276, 277 (2014) (claiming that Islamic law is
mostly a jurist law). This is the view held by many scholars, but it obscures the role of judges,
government administrators and other public officials in the creation of law.
24 Nimrod Hurvitz, The Contribution ofEarly Islamic Rulers to Adjudication and Legislation:
The Case of the Mazalim Tribunals, in LAW AND EMPIRE: IDEAS, PRACTICES, ACTORS 135 (Jeroen
Duindam et al. eds., 2013).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 For example, the table of contents for a typical juristic treatise on substantive law will cover
topics like sales transactions, leases, trusts, torts, criminal punishment, etc. See WAELHALLAQ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 29-30 (2009).
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strictly religious, emerged in early juristic writings: a collective or communal
duty (fard kiy2aya).28
Collective duties consist of activities or roles that a society needs enough
of its citizens to perform. 2 9 If an adequate number of people fulfill these duties
then everyone else is exempt from them, but if no one fulfills them then everyone
is liable. Historically, jurists kept these duties separate, rarely re-categorizing a
collective duty as individually obligated, or vice versa. In the rare instances that
they did re-categorize a duty, it was temporary and generally specific to a
locality. For instance, performing funeral rites for the deceased is a collective
duty. 30 However, if only one person in a town knows the rites it becomes
individually obligated for that person until someone else is trained.3 ' Everywhere
else, performing funeral rites remains collectively obligated. The temporary and
local nature of such re-categorization is key. As noted above, this framework has
only one exception: the modem conception of the jihad-duty.
Pre-modern jurists developed an entire doctrine around these collective
duties, finding different ways to group them. In many respects, they were trying
to develop theory for law that they had developed in response to social needs.
Some even proposed three broad types of collective duties: acts related to
religion, acts related to livelihood, and acts related to both religion and
livelihood. 32 Jurists also gave various justifications for classifying an act as a
collective duty. For instance, certain acts are collective duties because they are
"useful to religion" or give "life to the Sharia," while in other instances, an act
"fortifies" the faith or reflects cooperation in the "performance of good works." 3 3
In the jihad context, in addition to achieving the above justifications, collective
duties empowered the state with the ability to regulate participation in war and
exert control over an important political and revenue-related activity. It also
allowed individuals to share responsibility for a moral obligation.
28 A literal translation of the legal term is "sufficiency obligation," indicating that if a sufficient
number of people perform, the duty is satisfied; however, it is commonly understood as a collective
duty.
29 Banan Malkawi & Tamara Sonn, Ibn Taymiyya on Islamic Governance, in ISLAM, THE
STATE, AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY: MEDIEVAL ISSUES AND MODERN CONCERNS 111, 114 (Asma
Afsaruddin ed., 2011).
30 Mairaj Syed, Jihad in Classical Islamic Legal and Moral Thought, in JUST WAR IN RELIGION
AND POLITICS: STUDIES IN RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 135, 144 (Jacob Neusner et al. eds.,
2013).
31 Id.
32 7 ABO HAMID AL-GHAZALi, AL-WASIT Ft AL-MADHHAB [THE MEDIATOR OF THE LEGAL
SCHOOL] 6-7 (1997).
33 30 ABO BAKR AL-SARAKHST, KITAB AL-MABSOT [THE EXTENSIVE BOOK] 245; 2 SARAKHST,
USOL AL-SARAKHSt [THE LEGAL THEORY OF SARAKHSI] 289; 1 GHAZALI, IHYA' 'ULUM AL-DtN [THE
REVIVAL OF RELIGIOUS SCIENCES] 66 (2004); MUHAMMAD AL-SHAYBANT, KITAB AL-KASB [THE
BOOK ON EARNING] 72.
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C. The Meaning of Jihid
Bearing the above in mind, pre-modem jurists spend considerable effort
developing rules for the jihad-duty. The term jihad often occurs in the Qur'an
where warfare is implied, but becomes more explicitly associated with warfare
in early juristic literature. However, semantically its meaning is to "struggle" in
general. Ibn Manzfir, the late 13th-century author of a well-regarded Arabic
dictionary, explains that the basic meaning of the Arabic termjihad is to struggle
against something or exert effort towards an objective. 3 4 While it is frequently
translated as holy war,jihad's "semantic meaning" has "no relation" to war, holy
or otherwise.35 It was eventually broadened in Sufi circles to include a "non-
violent" element, specifically the struggle against one's own desires. They
characterized this dichotomy between a non-violent and violent jihad as between
a "greater jihad" (al-jihad al-akbar) and "lesser jihad" (al-jihad al-asghar),
respectively. 36 Jurists have tried to connect this greaterjihadto a "personal moral
struggle," even suggesting that it divides into a "jihd against the self' and a
"jihad against the devil." 37 However, the idea of greater jihad is "often rejected
by many in Islam's mainstream 'orthodoxy' from the late medieval period
onwards." 3 8 Hence, when jihad occurs "without qualifiers" it is "universally
understood as war on behalf of Islam." 3 9 As a result, in the legal literature, jih5d
has meant "armed struggle against the unbelievers" and for our purposes that is
exclusively how it will be considered here.40
34 3 IBN MAN2I'R, LISAN AL-cARAB [THE LANGUAGE OF THE ARABS] 135 (1990).
35 REUVEN FIRESTONE, JIHAD: THE ORIGIN OF HOLY WAR IN ISLAM 16 (1999).
36 AHMED AL-DAWOODY, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF WAR: JUSTIFICATIONS AND REGULATIONS 76-
77 (2011); see also RUDOLPH PETERS, JIHAD IN CLASSICAL AND MODERN ISLAM: A READER 1-5
(1996) [hereinafter JIHAD READER] (discussing the utilization ofjihad in religion and warfare).
37 Id.
38 Gavin Picken, The Greater Jihad in Classical Islam, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JIHAD:
LAW, SOCIETY AND MILITARY ACTION 126 (Elisabeth Kendall & Ewan Stein eds., 2015)
(discussing the contextualization of the term "jihad" through history as a result of specific historical
and political circumstances). Some recent scholarship has tried to argue, with mixed results, that
the militaristic aspect of jihad was not as prominent early on as it is now. It claims that due to
sociopolitical circumstances, the term's meaning, as found in the Qur'an, hadith and exegetical
literature, actually narrowed as compared to its original meaning which encompassed many other
aspects. See generally ASMA AFSARUDDIN, STRIVING IN THE PATH OF GOD: JIHAD AND MARTYRDOM
IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT (2013).
39 FIRESTONE, supra note 35, at 17.
40 JIHAD READER, supra note 36, at 1. Peters also notes that when the word jihad is used
"without qualification," it means armed struggle. See id. at 1-3. As Suleiman Mourad and James
E. Lindsay note, "in a specifically religious context, and as understood and articulated by almost
every Muslim religious scholar past and present, including Ibn Manzar,jihdd has one meaning: to
exert one's effort in fighting the enemies of God by acts or by words." 99 SULEIMAN A. MOURAD
& JAMES E. LINDSAY, THE INTENSIFICATION AND REORIENTATION OF SUNNI JIHAD IDEOLOGY IN THE
CRUSADER PERIOD 16 (Sebastian Giinther & Wadad Kadi eds., 2013).
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"Armed action" (qital) is an essential aspect of jihad and the larger
concept of "struggle" mentioned in the Qur'an. 4 1 The Qur'an provides some
guidelines for when armed action is necessary and what the limits are for
"justified military combat." 4 2 Furthermore, Muhammad's historical practice also
informs Islamic legal thought on jihad. Tradition records Muhammad
participating in at least 27 military campaigns of his own and deputizing persons
to lead about 59 others.4 3 His biographers have coined a term about this period
in his life: al-maghazT (the raids)." Muhammad's behavior during and around
these battles is used as justification or refutation of opinions that later jurists
developed.
In addition to the Qur'an and Muhammad's practice, it is important to
bear in mind that these rules were initially developed as Late Antique Muslim
empires emerged and were then elaborated in scholastic institutions during the
Middle Ages.4 5 In this context, religion and warfare were often closely connected
and not only in Islam. Centuries earlier, specifically in the 4th century, "militant
interpretations of the Christian message and mission" had become "normative"
both for Roman policy and Christian communities. 46 In some respects, later
Western theories of just war are premised on this background. The idea of "just
war" is also captured in Islam's law of armed conflict, which includes concern
for the "a priori reasons for engaging in justified armed conflict" (jus ad bellum)
and issues of "humane conduct" (jus in bello).4 7
Developing rules for jihad requires accommodating both aspects of its
definition: the functional and the pietistic. The functional perspective relates to
tasks associated with war's administrative and military objectives. Jurists
generally agree that the jihad obligation is connected to certain functions:
propagating religion, supporting the state's activities, defending against attack
and rescuing prisoners of war. 4 8 For example, the 9th century jurist Muhammad
41 Mustansir Mir, Jihad in Islam, in THE JIHAD AND ITS TIMES 114 (Hadia Dajani-Shakeel &
Ronald A. Messier eds., 1991).
42 See AFSARUDDIN, supra note 38, at 34.
43 See MOURAD & LINDSAY, supra note 40, at 18.
4 Id.
45 See generally Rabb, supra note 21, at 546 (discussing the development of scholastic
institutions and schools of law during the Middle Ages).
46 THOMAS SIZGORICH, VIOLENCE AND BELIEF IN LATE ANTIQUITY: MILITANT DEVOTION IN
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 5 (2009). As some scholars have noted, Constantine's evocation of the
"symbol of Christ in his military drive to seize Rome" was one of the acts that fixated a Christian
holy war conception in late antiquity that eventually "morphed into the high medieval crusade."
PHILIPPE Buc, HOLY WAR, MARTYRDOM, AND TERROR: CHRISTIANITY, VIOLENCE, AND THE WEST
24-25 (2015). The one major difference in the crusader period was that, unlike in the holy war of
late antiquity, it involved "ordinary believers massively, both as combatants and as economic and
spiritual supporters." Id. at 25. This is very similar to roles played injihad.
47 AFSARUDDIN, supra note 38, at 34-35.
48 QARAFI, supra note 9, at 388-89.
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b. Idris al-Shific 4 9 defined jihad's basic purpose as preventing the enemy from
entering Muslim territory and sending Muslims on military campaigns to convert
or impose a poll tax (jizya) on non-Muslims.50
The second aspect was pietistic, focusing on what it means for the fighter
to perform this act. For instance, some jurists spoke of how jihad meant
"strenuously striving to improve oneself." 5' Others discussed the jihad-duty as
an act meant to "elevate God's word and bring greatness to His religion." 52 They
considered jihad a "significant act of worship" (min al-cibadat al cazima) and in
their treatises placed it alongside other individual acts of worship, such as prayer
and fasting. In contrast, those who emphasized the functional aspect classified
jihad as a part of criminal law (findyat) and considered it a state-administered
"punishment for disbelief' (cuqilba cald al-kufr).53
By way of background, there were two primary categories of fighters in
the early Islamic context. The first was the "volunteer" (muta*tawwic) who
performed military service without compensation (cata') but was apportioned
parts of the war booty and promised divine recompense. The second category
was the "non-volunteer fighter" (muqdtila) who received a stipend and
eventually formed the basis of a professional military class. 54 Pre-modern jurists
were generally uncomfortable with the commodification of religious duties like
jihad and many prohibited payment in return for fulfilling obligatory acts. They
49 ShdfiT (d. 820) is a "centrally important figure in the history of Islamic law," and he is
considered to have authored the earliest surviving work containing a "sustained theoretical account
of textual interpretation, legal epistemology, and legal reasoning in Islamic law." Joseph Lowry,
Introduction to MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS AL-SHAFIci, THE EPISTLE ON LEGAL THEORY xv (Philip F.
Kennedy et al. eds., Joseph E. Lowry trans., 2013).
so 81 MICHAEL BONNER, ARISTOCRATIC VIOLENCE AND HOLY WAR: STUDIES IN THE JIHAD AND
THE ARAB-BYZANTINE FRONTIER 40 (Edwin Gerow et al. eds., 1996) (citing Shafici's Kitab al-
Umm 4:90.9f).
s 14 ABO 'L-HASAN AL-MAWARDI, AL-HAWI AL-KABIR FT FIQH MADHHAB AL-IMAM AL-SHAFIcI
[THE GREAT COMPENDIUM OF THE SHAFFI SCHOOL OF LAW] 114 (1999). lbn Taymiyya also speaks
of ajihad that is fought "against the desires of one's own soul." Interestingly enough, he classifies
this as an individual obligation (fard 'ayn), whereas he considers armed struggle to be a collective
duty (fardkiraya). 10 IBN TAYMIYYA, MAJMCTc AL-FATAWA [COLLECTION OF LEGAL OPINIONs] 357
(2005). In this classification, the jihad against one's own desires is seemingly a more important
obligation than participating in armed struggle.
52 ABO BAKR AL-SARAKHSI, supra note 33, at 262-63.
53 QARAFI, supra note 9, at 384. This was how Malik and his associates classified it.
54 BONNER, supra note 50, at 7-8. It is not entirely clear how pre-modem jurists reconciled the
jihad-duty with these different categories of soldiers since they only seem to contemplate
volunteers fighting. However, both the idea ofjihad as a collective duty and the idea of various
soldier classes exist in early Islamic history. In my opinion, this presents a challenge for
understanding how collective duties operated in practice and is a subject I plan to explore in more
detail elsewhere.
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.considered it impermissible to wage jihad as mercenaries for rent because you
cannot "rent an act of worship or the performance of a religious duty."
This duality of purpose, functional and pietistic, is at the heart of
jurisdictional claims over jihid. While the state relies on the pietistic component
to help supply its ranks, the functional aspect is its primary objective. The change
in duty strains the relationship between these two components and brings the role
of the state into question.
D. Debating the State
The relationship between Islamic law and the state is a subject of intense
debate within the field of Islamic legal studies. Though the details of the debate
are beyond the scope of this Article, a few points are important to appreciate.
With respect to the pre-modem period, academics argue about the exact nature
of the relationship between private juristic authority and the effective power of
the state. In the contemporary period, the question is how this pre-modem
religious authority should be realized in the modem state. Some reject the idea
that Islamic law is compatible with law in a nation-state. They operate on an
implicit assumption that to be authentic, Islamic law must be in its pre-modem
form and implemented through a pre-modem governance structure. Hence, any
accommodation of modem legal systems or modern forms of political
organization carries the potential either to corrupt Islamic law, as medievalist
Wael Hallaq contends, or to corrupt the secular nature of the modem state, as
human rights scholar Abdullahi An-Na'im argues.56 In contrast, many scholars
based in the Muslim world, like Ahmed al-Dawoody, offer a neater overlap with
the Western framework, such that most aspects of secular rule of law find
counterparts in Islamic law.
I believe both these approaches are flawed. Islamic law is a product of
many centuries of differently situated jurists interpreting the foundational
sources of the faith. No period, either classical or contemporary, can lay claim to
the authentic, or to use Hallaq's term, "paradigmatic," version of Islamic law; it
55 SARAKHST, SHARH AL-SIYAR AL-KABIR [COMMENTARY ON THE COMPENDIUM OF
REGULATIONS] 944 (1997). GhaziT also reports that jurists from the Shifit legal tradition reject
the hiring of a Muslim to performjihadon someone else's behalf becausejiha5d is a duty and cannot
be transferred in that fashion. GHAZALI, supra note 32, at 18. However, he argues that the head of
state (imam) is permitted to hire slaves for jihdd (if their masters give permission), as well as to
hire people who don't meet the legal standard for performance of religious duties, such as minors
and non-Muslims. Id. As justification, he cites the fact that the Prophet permitted hiring Jewish
fighters for certain military expeditions. Id. He gives the ruler broad latitude over the circumstances
when it would be appropriate to hire people for jihad. Id. at 16.
56 See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE:
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI'A 1-2 (2008); WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE:
ISLAM, POLITICS, AND MODERNITY'S MORAL PREDICAMENT 37-38 (2013).
5 See generally DAWOODY, supra note 36, at 108.
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has consistently adapted in diverse ways to contexts far removed from its origins.
At the same time, Islamic law cannot escape the fact that it is a religious law; one
that places greater value on older jurisprudence and whose basic structures were
elaborated in a series of diverse pre-modem and early modem socio-political
situations. As a result, there are inevitable, often insurmountable, points of
conflict between Islamic law and modem secular legal systems. It is critical not
to obscure the significant challenges that arise in adapting a law premised on
religion and developed in the context of empire, to a modem, secular republic.5 8
While the term "state" is loaded with many meanings and deeply
contested, I use it for practical reasons in order to avoid using various terms,
some unwieldy, to refer to a broad set of govemance structures. 5 9 This is not
unique in the field of medieval Islamic studies despite the term's inadequacies. 60
Furthermore, I believe the definition Islamic law uses for the "state" is a
functional one: as long as an entity performs certami activities, it acquires rights
and responsibilities associated with governance. These activities include
adjudicating disputes, punishing crime, regulating the marketplace, collecting
taxes, administering religious services, engaging in warfare and negotiating
external agreements. For my purposes, in the context of jihad, Max Weber's
well-known definition of state, offered in his "Politics as a Vocation" lecture in
1919, is especially useful because it puts the issue in its starkest light. He says
that "the state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to
the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory . . . ."61
He goes on to note that any other entity can only "assert the right to use physical
violence" when the state "permits them to do so." 6 2 In other words, "the state is
5 When I speak of the imperial context, I am speaking of the relationships that often
characterize empire-specifically, the ruler/ruled dynamic or the master/slave. I recognize that
other smaller polities operated within the larger empire and that jurists often transcended the
boundaries of the state, operating as part of an international network.
59 Theoretically, one might also use the term "polity" instead, but, stylistically, "state" makes
for easier reading. For classic definitions of the "state," see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 134-42
(Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962); JoHN HOFFMAN, BEYOND THE STATE: AN INTRODUCTORY CRITIQUE
19 (1995); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 101-48 (1968); and 1 MAX WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 56 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans.,
1978).
60 See MICHAEL COOK, ANCIENT RELIGIONS, MODERN POLITICS: THE ISLAMIC CASE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1-3 (2014) (using the term "state" as part of a broader concept of the
"nation state" throughout different regions of the world); FRED M. DONNER, THE EARLY ISLAMIC
CONQUESTS 38-39 (1981) (utilizing the term "state" to discuss governing formations prior to
Islamic control); IRA M. LAPIDUS, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES (2d ed. 2002); Roy
MOTrAHEDEH, LOYALTY AND LEADERSHIP IN AN EARLY ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1980).
61 MAX WEBER, THE VOCATION LECTURES 33 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney
Livingtstone trans., 2004) (emphasis omitted).
62 Id.
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regarded as the sole source of the 'right' to use violence." 63 As the next Part will
show, this is precisely how I believe pre-modern Islamic law envisions the state's
relationship to violence. Jurists considered violence to be legitimate only under
the administration of a political authority and indicate this when writing about
the jihd-duty.
III. THE CLASSICAL JIHAD-DUTY
Pre-modern jurists assigned the "right" to use violence almost
exclusively to the state. It was an integral part of their extensive commentary on
the jihad-duty-a commentary that is essential for understanding how the duty
functions today. As one scholar notes, when contemporary militant jurists revive
the classical jihad doctrine, they connect "significant numbers of young Muslim
men to paradigmatic moments of their past .. . ."6 This both enhances and
directs "their incentive to challenge forces seen as responsible for the decline of
Muslim fortunes in the modem world." 65 The pre-modemjihad-duty has as its
principal scriptural support a Qur'anic verse that compares the virtues of people
who fight in "God's way" and those who stay behind:
Those believers who stay at home, apart from those with an
incapacity, are not equal to those who comnit themselves and
their possessions to striving in God's way. God has raised such
people to a rank above those who stay at home-although He
has promised all believers a good reward, those who strive are
favored with a tremendous reward above those who stay at
home ... .6 6
Jurists noted that while the verse's literal implication is that the duty to
fight is incumbent upon everyone, a later portion of the verse indicates that both
sets of people, those who fight and those who stay behind, will receive God's
"reward." 6 7 In other words, they understood the verse to mean that staying behind
does not imply a failure to fulfill the duty and there is no penalty associated with
it. Due to the absence of a penalty for non-performance the duty was considered
collectively obligated.6 8
63 Id.
6 John C. M. Calvert, The Striving Shaykh: Abdullah Azzam and the Revival of Jihdd, J.
RELIGION & Soc'Y 83, 85 (Supp. II 2007).
65 Id.
66 THE QUR'AN 60 (M.A.S. Abdul-Haleem trans., 2004) (citing chapter 4, verse 95, hereinafter
formatted as Q 4/al-Nisi' :95).
67 MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS AL-SHAFIci, AL-RISALAH [THE EPISTLE] 365 (1940).
68 See I IBN cABD AL-BARR, JAMIcA BAYAN AL-cILM WA FADILHU [A COMPENDIUM OF
STATEMENTS ON KNOWLEDGE AND ITS BENEFITS] 60 (1994); 7 cALA' AL-DTN AL-KASANT, BADA'ic
AL-SANA 'Ic [THE MARVELOUS ART] 98 (1974); ISMAcIL B. YAHYA AL-MUZANI, MUKHTASAR AL-
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A. Jihld as a Collective Duty
Jihad is unlike any other duty within the category of collective duties.
Medieval jurists generally claimed a consensus (cifma) that jihad is a collective
duty and not individually obligated.69 On this view, jihad functions as a key
mechanism through which the Muslim state exerts its authority and maintains its
legitimacy: the state historically used jihad to defend itself against attack and
expand its frontiers.70 In fact, some scholars argue that the development of a
"classical theory" around the entire category of collective duties emerged as a
result of early jurists addressing the "problem of finding enough men to fight on
the frontiers, [] while preserving a role in all this for constituted authority, the
sul.tan."7 Only the state had the ability to preemptively declarejihad; otherwise,
the duty was triggered when people faced an impending attack.72 In the collective
context, persons subject to the jihad-duty were free, sane men of mature age;
when the duty was individualized, then everyone, regardless of gender or status,
was obligated.73
MUZANT [MUZANT'S ABRIDGED EXPosITION] 353 (1998); 5 IBN QUDAMA AL-MAQDISI, AL-KAFI FT
FIQH IBN HANBAL [THE SUFFICIENT EXPOSITION OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF IBN HANBAL] 453
(1997); 2 ABC ISHAQ AL-SHIRAZI, AL-MUHADHDHAB FT FIQH AL-IMAM AL-SHAFI9 [THE REFINED
EXAMINATION OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SHAFIcl] 265 (1995). Another verse supports this position
by stating that "it is not right for all the believers to go out [to battle] together: out of each
community, a group should go out to gain understanding of the religion, so that they can teach their
people ..... QUR'AN, supra note 66, at 127 (citing Q 9/al-Tawba: 122). Shdfii cites precedent from
one of Muhammad's closest associates, CAll b. Abi Tdlib, who did not join the battle of Tabtik.
SHAFTS, supra note 67, at 365.
69 1 IBN RUSHD (d. 1198), BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID [THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST'S PRIMER] 454
(Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans., 1984). Specifically, he cites Q 2/al-Baqara:216 as the basis of
juristic consensus that jihad is an obligation and not voluntary: "[fjighting is ordained for you,
though you dislike it. You may dislike something although it is good for you, or like something
although it is bad for you: God knows and you do not." QUR'AN, supra note 66, at 24. He then cites
Q 9/al-Tawba: 122 (previously quoted) as the reason why it is a collective duty as opposed to an
individual obligation.
70 See JIHAD READER, supra note 36, at 2-6.
7 See Michael Bonner, Some Observations Concerning the Early Development of Jihad on
the Arab-Byzantine Frontier, 75 STUDIA ISLAMICA 28 (1992) (speaking of Shdficl specifically)
[hereinafter Arab-Byzantine Frontier]. In fact, Bonner contends that the kif2ya theory was "not yet
available" for authors of specific books on jihad, like Abil Ishiq al-Faztilf and CAbdalldh b. al-
Mubdrak. Id. Elsewhere he notes that the theory came about in connection to the "development of
the concept of cumma', as military service became increasingly understood as pertaining to one's
status as a Muslim." Michael Bonner, Jaca'il and Holy War in Early Islam, 68 DER ISLAM 45, 46
(1991) [hereinafter Jaca 'il and Holy War].
72 Unlike in the medieval Christian context where Urban II eventually "took the prerogative
for declaring holy war away from emperors and kings," leaving it for individuals and the Church,
it is only in recent decades that there has been a widespread disintegration of the state's role in
waging jihad. BONNER, supra note 50, at 3.
73 See BONNER, supra note 50, at 39.
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The absence of standing armies in early Islamic history meant that
governing authorities necessarily relied on volunteer forces to pursue defensive
or offensive military campaigns. As a collective duty, jihad gives the state full
jurisdiction over military affairs. The state determines when and where warfare
exists, as well as who participates in it. Only the state can trigger the duty by
issuing a call for volunteer fighters. It also determines when to halt the fighting.
The state sets the overall size of the deployment and the number of soldiers a
locality is required to contribute. If any of them fail to perform or a minimum
number of required performers do not step forward, then everyone in the locality
is liable for non-performance of the duty.74
B. Jihad as an Individual Obligation
As noted above, an individual obligation designated the duty to a single
person and only that person's performance could satisfy the obligation. In the
jihad context, the duty became individualized only in cases of emergency, i.e.,
for defensive purposes during an invasion. In such cases, every able-bodied
person was burdened with the duty to fight. Classically, the majority of jurists
considered this expanded application of the duty to be temporary.75 There was
no notion that individually-obligated jihad was the de facto, permanent state. 7 6
This distinction is particularly important because the major shift in thinking
among contemporary jurists, particularly militant jurists, is that the jihad-duty is
now essentially in a permanent state of being individually obligated. In order to
get a sense of how they arrive at this idea and the significance of its departure
from classical legal thought, it is important to consider pre-cursors in the pre-
modem discussion.7 7 Pre-modem jurists permitted the collective-individual
transformation to take place in three specific scenarios: when performance of the
duty is initiated, when border (or frontier) towns come under attack and when
there is an unexpected encounter with enemy forces.78
74 It should be noted that, classically, fighters could be exempt from participation in thejihad-
duty for a variety of reasons, such as being unable to secure riding animals. 14 IBN cABD AL-BARR,
AL-ISTIDHKAR [THE REMINISCENCE] 292 (1993).
7 See RUDOLPH PETERS, ISLAM AND COLONIALISM: THE DOCTRINE OF JIHAD IN MODERN
HISTORY 36-37 (Leo Laeyendecker & Jacques Waardenburg eds., 1979) [hereinafter
COLONIALISM] (describing situations in which jihd terminates and no longer requires obligation).
6 AL-GHAZALT, supra note 32, at 12; KASANI, supra note 68, at 98; 3 cALA AL-DIN AL-
SAMARQANDI, TUHFAT AL-FUQAHA' [GEMS OF THE JURISTS] 294 (1984).
n Jurists often reject this idea ofjihadbeing an individual obligation by noting that the Prophet
himself did not participate in certain military expeditions he dispatched and that it would be
unthinkable for the Prophet to forgo an individual obligation. KASANI, supra note 68, at 98.
78 There is some mention of this in the secondary literature as well, but the discussion is often
incomplete. Rudolph Peters mentions three instances where jihad becomes an individual
obligation: appointment by the caliph, swearing an oath to fight and defending one's region if it is
under attack. JIHAD READER, supra note 36, at 3-4.
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In the first case, the jihad-duty becomes an individual obligation as soon
as performance begins. Jurists agreed that every collective duty is individually
obligated for whoever takes substantial steps towards fulfilling it.79 In essence,
once you begin performance, the duty is assigned to you. There were differences
as to when the exact point of initiation was. Opinions ranged from as soon as the
army marches to not until the army enters the battlefield.80 The "obligation
through initiation" condition was particularly important in the context of military
substitution (jac' i). 81 Substitution was when a person who had been assigned
the duty to fight arranged for someone else to perform it instead, sometimes in
return for compensation. 82 Jurists opposed this transfer because once a
substituted individual enters the battlefield they themselves acquire an individual
obligation to perform. In other words, it is no longer possible for the substituted
individual to satisfy the duty on behalf of someone else because they are now
personally responsible. 83
Two other scenarios where jurists permitted changing the nature of the
jihad-duty were when an enemy attacks a border town under Muslim sovereignty
or when one comes upon the enemy unexpectedly. These are classic self-defense
scenarios where the collective duty's preconditions are suspended due to an
imminent attack. Everyone in proximity to the attack must engage in the fight
out of necessity.8 4 Hence, while normally the jihad-duty could only be
discharged by a direct order from the head of state (imam), in cases of imminent
attack the inhabitants of a besieged town did not need to wait for the state's
7 See, e.g., 2 SARAKHST, USOL AL-SARAKHSi [The Legal Theory of Sarakhsl] 289.
so 7 YAHfYA b. SHARAF AL-NAWAW, RAWDAT AL-TALIBIN [The Training of Students] 416
(2003).
81 Substitution, in the sense of military substitute, seems to be "first clearly attested for" in the
reign of Mucawiya (661-680 CE), but there were "scattered references" prior to this as well. In the
battle of Badr, "one of every two warriors" stayed at home and Abil Bakr even summoned an "army
of substitutes" in his caliphate. The early references to substitution used the term badil, which
contains differences from the later concept ofjaca'il. See Jaca'il and Holy War, supra note 71, at
47-48.
82 In general, leasing individuals to fight on your behalf was not permitted by jurists. For
instance, according to Abii Ishlq al-FazrT, Awzder did not allow someone to be hired for the
purpose of fighting (samic n cannahu la yasham li-l-cabid wa al-ujard'). He also did not require
the participation of slaves (cabid), blacksmiths (al-hadid) and farriers (al-bi tar) in this category.
ABO ISHAQ AL-FAZART, KITAB AL-SIYAR [BOOK ON THE LAWS OF WAR] 193-94 (1987); see also
Arab-Byzantine Frontier, supra note 71, at 21. There are several hadith from the early period as
well that make a distinction between someone who stays back from war but provides a donation to
a fighter versus someone who hires someone else to go in his place. Jaca'il and Holy War, supra
note 71, at 52. Unlike hiring someone, donations do not involve a quidpro quo. Id. at 52.
83 SHIRAzI, supra note 68, at 266.
84 IBN cABD AL-BARR, supra note 74, at 292 (requiring the performance from "every person in
that vicinity," especially those with the "requisite strength necessary to achieve victory," regardless
of whether they are "lightly armed" and "young").
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instruction, unless they were unable to handle the situation." If they were
incapable of handling the hostile situation themselves or were too weak, then the
duty fell on the people in closest proximity to the besieged town.86
That said, even here, jurists debated how to define what constituted an
"attack." There was apparent consensus that a collective jihad-duty became an
individual jihad obligation if enemy forces actually enter a Muslim city.87
However, the nature of the duty prior to their actual entrance into the city was
controversial. Some jurists converted the duty into an individual obligation at
points other than the army's entry into a city. For them, the duty became
individually obligated as soon as enemy forces "set foot on Muslim land," if they
"persist[ed]" in the land or if they began to "descend upon its gates, but [did] not
enter."88
In addition, when an attack occurred and there was no time to prepare,
standard subordinate relationships were superseded by the locality's need for
defense. For instance, in the pre-modern period, women needed permission from
their male guardians, typically their husbands or fathers, to participate in jihad,
but during an attack, this requirement was temporarily lifted.89 In other words,
everyone, regardless of social status, must fight, and the ordinary constraints
previously mitigating an individual's involvement are no longer valid.90 Hence,
groups normally exempt from the jihad-duty, like slaves, children and married
women, were required to perform if they possessed the requisite strength,
regardless of whether they received permission from their masters, parents or
husbands, respectively. 91 The reason was simple: if one had to seek permission
to defend oneself then one would place one's life in danger and this would be
"self-destructive," let alone destructive for the collective. As a result, a besieged
town's residents can give precedence to the "right" of self-defense over anyone
else's rights with respect to them. 92
Jurists also discussed the nature of the obligation for people who reside
outside the locality under attack. Most suggested that the participation of non-
residents is only necessary when the collective duty cannot be adequately
8s See, e.g., IBN QUDAMA, supra note 68, at 456 (requires everyone to perform the duty as soon
as the enemy descends on Muslim land).
86 KAsANI, supra note 68, at 98.
87 10 AL-HUSAYN B. MASCOD AL-BAGHAWl, SHARH AL-SUNNA [COMMENTARY ON TRADITION]
375 (1983).
88 MAWARDI, supra note 51, at 112-13 (supporting the position of a persistent attack that
presents the possibility of losing territory); 7 YAHYA B. SHARAF AL-NAWAWI, RAWDAT AL-TALIBIN
[THE TRAINING OF STUDENTS] 416 (2003) (discussing all three positions).
89 GHAZALI, supra note 32, at 11-12.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 11. Similarly, debtors would ordinarily be required to get permission from their
creditors before engaging injihdd, but in this scenario, it is not required.
92 SHIRAZi, supra note 68, at 269-70.
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addressed without them.93 Others noted that in addition to the inability to resist,
if residents of the territory under attack feared for their land and offspring, then
the duty was triggered for non-residents. 9 4 These non-residents, particularly
those in closest proximity, were required to remain "alert" and ready to
respond. 95
In sum, the classical jihad-duty that pre-modem jurists developed
functioned as a collective duty by default. Not everyone needed to perform as
long as enough people did. In certain circumstances, the duty could transform
into an individual obligation where everyone was required to perform. This was
never permanent; it was a temporary allowance due to immediate need.
Additionally, it did not extend to people residing outside the area under attack
unless the head of state or besieged residents required assistance. To a great
extent, the nature of the obligation on specific individuals is dependent on who
has jurisdiction overjihad at a particular moment. To understand this better, it is
necessary to explore how different authorities exercised jurisdiction overjihad
in the classical legal tradition.
IV. JURISDICTION OVER JIHXD
For my purposes, there are two critical questions here: who has
jurisdiction over the jihad-duty and what conditions allow this jurisdiction to be
challenged. This Part investigates the legal tradition to extract more details on
the ways in which the state, in theory, exerts authority over thejiha5d-duty. It also
discusses how the two types of authority, state and non-state, interact. Having
understood how this authority operates, we are then able to examine the ways in
which militant jurists contest it in the modem period.
A. State Authority
Most pre-modem discussions on the jihad-duty, by Sunni and Shi'i
jurists alike, assumed that the duty was regulated by a state or other political
authority. Unlike the writings of many Islamic jurists 96 in the modem period,
pre-modem jurists did not believe that individuals possessed the right to declare
9 I ABO BAKR IBN cARABT, AHKAM AL-QUR'AN [LEGAL RULES OF THE QUR'AN] 205 (2003);
BAGHAWI, supra note 87; GHAZALi, supra note 32, at 12; SAMARQANDI, supra note 76, at 294.
94 4 ABO BAKR AL-JASSAS, AHKAM AL-QUR'AN [LEGAL RULES OF THE QUR'AN] 311 (1996).
95 Id. at 312.
96 By "Islamic jurist," I mean individuals engaged exclusively in understanding Islamic law.
While the term "Muslim jurist" is commonly used instead, it carries the potential for confusion.
There are many jurists who are Muslim and engaged in the jurisprudence of their respective
countries but not involved in Islamic law.
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jihad.9 7 Two aspects of state authority in the context of pre-modemjiha5d figure
prominently here. First, the state had sole jurisdiction over jihad except for
certain circumstances. This jurisdiction includes the power to declare war, to
punish non-participation and to raise an army. Second, the scope of the state's
authority in military matters was mainly obligating people to protect Muslim
territory. 98 If necessary, it could also include obligating the pursuit of hostile
forces into enemy territory. 9 9
As for the fighting force's composition, the state possessed authority to
determine who could participate, but jurists permitted some flexibility here. This
is where the tension between jihad as a religious obligation (pietistic) and jihad
as a tool for exerting state power (functional) come to light. Although pre-
modem jurists discouraged individuals from participating in jihad without state
permission, not all of them forbade it. An individual who joined the fight without
pernission was not considered blameworthy.' It is less clear what their opinion
was on situations where an individual received a direct order not to participate
but did so anyway. Regardless, this dispensation highlights the balance that must
be struck when the state has authority over acts that are also moral obligations.
As mentioned earlier, the key roles for the state in the jihad-duty were
to indicate when the fighting will commence and when it should cease; how
many fighters must be deployed; where those fighters should come from; and,
theoretically, what the penalty was for non-compliance. Classical jurists noted
that the head of state (imam), as part of his official duties, could personally take
charge of the jihad and trigger the collective duty. 0 1 They were the only
individuals empowered in this fashion; no other individual could assume
responsibility for jihad.10 2 The duty began collectively and became individually
obligated on everyone in the immediate vicinity of the attack, depending on its
97 For a good overview of classical Sunni jurists' views on this, see cAmmar Khan Nasir, Jihad
kTfardlyat awr us ka ikhtiydr: chand ghaltfahmlydn (Jihad's Obligation and its Pursuit: Some
Misconceptions), ALSHARIA (Nov.-Dec. 2009), http://www.alsharia.org/mujallaI2009/nov-
dec/jihad-farziyyat-ammar#top. The predominant Twelver Shi'i view on this was even more
restrictive: jihdd could only be waged "under the leadership of the rightful 1mam" and, after 873
CE, "theoretically no lawful jihad" could be fought because the Imam was hidden. JIHAD READER,
supra note 36, at 4. Of course, Shi'i jurists developed an exception for "defensive jihad" and went
to great lengths to frame military confrontations in this manner. See Id. at 3-4 (discussing the
obligations of "defensive jihad" on all Muslims).
98 SHIRAZI, supra note 68, at 269-70 (requiring security measures be taken to protect the
territory, like placing emissaries, building castles and digging trenches). Classical jurists required
the head of state gather forces for both removing enemy forces from Muslim land and securing that
land in the first place.
99 Id.
I00 Id.
101 MAWARDI, supra note 51, at 113. This does not account for the exceptions noted above




persistence and intensity. 10 3 Jurists also allowed a retreating enemy force to be
pursued into territory outside the jurisdiction of the Muslim polity. They noted
that while technically pursuing enemy forces is no longer a defensive act, thus
not individually obligated, the head of state is permitted to extend the individual
obligation in this manner as a strategic military decision. 10 4 Historically, jurists
connected the ruler's power to move forces into other territories with his ability
to obligate people to migrate (hijra).o5 Early Islamic history featured a number
of migrations, including the mass migration from Mecca to Yathrib (later named
Medina) in 622.106 Jurists connected the two cases, jihad and migration, because
each involved the state's ability to physically displace its constituents. Likejihad,
in the case of migration they stressed that only the ruler has authority to do this.'0 o
Not only does the state have jurisdiction over administering the jihad-
duty, but some, not all, pre-modern jurists also required preemptive engagement
in jihad. Specifically, they encouraged the state to engage in regular military
campaigns against adversaries and raise an army annually to undertake jihad' 0 8
They listed multiple reasons for this: to demonstrate "Islam's presence," to stop
harm being caused, to collect tributes, and to present a "compelling propagation"
of the faith.1 09 Jurists disagreed about where military campaigns should be
focused: some favored a narrower mandate based on territory of strategic
importance, while others included everywhere outside Muslim sovereignty." 0
Many also viewed these campaigns as a means of revenue generation for the
state. They reasoned that a minimum of one military engagement per year was
necessary to collect tribute (jizya) from "non-Muslim subjects" (dhimma), in lieu
103 Id.
10 7 IBN HAZM, AL-MUHALLA [THE ADORNED TREATISE] 291 (2001); see SAHIH AL-BUKHARI
3077, BOOK 56, HADITH 283; SAHH MUSLIM 1353, BOOK 15, HADITH 507; SUNAN AB3 DAWOD
2480, BOOK 15, HADITH 4; and SUNAN AL-NASA'I4170, BOOK 39, HADITH 22. He quotes a famous
tradition of the Prophet that the obligation to emigrate, as in the migration to Medina, is no longer
operative after the conquest of Mecca. The only exception is in the context ofjihad; hence, if you
are summoned (presumably by the ruler) to emigrate for the sake ofjihdd, you must go forth.
105 See generally Muhammad Khalid Masud, The Obligation to Migrate: The Doctrine of
"Hira " in Islamic Law, in MUSLIM TRAVELLERS: PILGRIMAGE, MIGRATION, AND THE RELIGIOUS
[MAGINATION 35 (Dale F. Eikelman et al. eds., 1990).
106 Id. at 30.
107 Qardfi reports a similar opinion from Sahnin b. SacTd (d. 854) that jihdd is no longer
obligatory (as an individual obligation) after the conquest of Mecca except if "the ruler commands
it." QARAFI, supra note 9, at 385.
108 AL-GHAZALI, supra note 32, at 6.
109 Id. This often focused on the "most dangerous" areas to Muslims. A ruler could delay this
annual jihad if the army was weak or if the roads to the enemy territory were in a poor state.
COLONIALISM, supra note 75, at 13. Some have argued that jihid actually functioned as a way to
legitimate a ruler, especially after the loss of political unity in the late 8th century. JIHAD READER,
supra note 36, at 5.
1O AL-GHAZALT, supra note 32, at 6.
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of taxes Muslims paid, "in exchange for providing them protection, which is an
alternative to waging war against them.""'
One point of dispute, briefly raised earlier, is what happened when,
despite the collective duty being fulfilled, a ruler wanted a more aggressive
engagement with the enemy in order to inflict a harsher blow. Put another way,
to what extent did the jihad-duty accommodate the state's ability to craft military
strategy? In this dispute, jurists allowed the state to utilize the jihad-duty for
strategic objectives beyond territorial defense. They required fighters to follow
the state's mandate in offensively engaging the enemy. 112 This again raises a
tension inherent in the jihad-duty because it operates as both a moral obligation
for individual Muslims and a mechanism for meeting the state's military
objectives. Repelling an attack on Muslim territory allows an individual's moral
obligation of self-defense to converge with the state's duty to safeguard its
population. In the defensive context, the moral duty on an individual to engage
the enemy on Muslim territory is clear, but it is less apparent when pursuing them
into foreign lands. The moral imperative weakens outside the defensive context,
but jurists still felt a functional need to accommodate the state's legitimate
strategy to continue the fight. Pre-modem jurists chose to extend the moral
imperative beyond the defense of one's land to the defense of the state's military
strategy. The confusion between these dual aims continues to play out in the
contemporary context as well.
B. Status-Based Authority
It is useful to briefly discuss the manner in which status-based authority
functions in the jihad context because, among other things, status-based authority
maintains a role in the present day as well. There are various reasons why pre-
modem jurists exempted an individual from the jihad-duty, the foremost of
which was the presence or absence of some personal characteristic that
disqualified their participation. Examples include a mental health issue, not
having reached the age of maturity, or even poverty. However, the jihad-duty
also contained another set of exemptions arising out of additional "authorities"
that exercised rights over individuals, superseding the state's authority.
I IBN QUDAMA, supra note 68, at 457. He goes on to state that based on need, the jihad-duty
can be carried out more than once a year. He does note that not all engagements with "non-
Muslims" are divided into either getting tribute or fighting. For instance, fighting might be excused
(or postponed) if these non-Muslims are received as guests, if it is necessary to wait for
reinforcements, if the supply chain on the road to battle is not sufficient, if delaying the fight will
allow them time to be tempted to become Muslim, etc. Id.
112 JASSAS, supra note 94, at 311. MawdrdT notes that aside from a defensive duty to protect
Muslim lands, the duty also extends to military campaigns in the "land of disbelievers" where they
are either fought until they embrace Islam or, if they do not accept Islam, agree to pay a poll tax.
He argues this on the basis of Q 2/al-Baqara:193, which instructs people to "fight them till there is
no longer chaos and all of religion belongs to God." MAwARDT, supra note 51, at 113.
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Classically, Islamic law empowered certain societal actors, like creditors, slave
masters, husbands and parents, with the right to prevent their subordinates from
participating in jihad in order to fulfill duties they were owed.11 3 This is an
interesting interference with the typical authorities having dominion over Islamic
law. 14 In thejihad context, this interference is especially significant since status-
based authorities were able to disrupt the state's ability to raise an army.
However, even status-based authority was restricted when the duty
transformed from collective to individual. Where a hostile party descended upon
a town, jurists agreed that permission from status-based authorities was not
required prior to participating. Parents could prevent their son from participating
in jihad because it would cause them emotional distress or they required him to
care for them. "1 As long as jihad was collective, it could be performed by others
and did not take precedence over the son's individual obligation to his parents.11 6
However, when there was an insufficient number of people to carry out the duty,
parental permission was no longer required.1 17 In the absence of an approaching
hostile party, parental authority must be respected, but when a hostile party
initiates an attack, fighting is privileged over the individual obligation to care for
one's parents." 8
In sum, in the classical period, the jihad-duty was primarily collective
except in special circumstances where it temporarily became an individual
obligation for everyone in a particular locality. In addition, it was assumed that
a state would regulate the jihad-duty except during an imminent attack.
Furthermore, with rare exceptions, the state had jurisdiction over the level of
participation necessary to satisfy the jihad-duty and also formulated military
strategy. This role for the state was not only established by legal treatises, but
also by the practice of Muslim states from the pre-modem period into the 19th
century. It was only with the arrival of European colonialism in Muslim territory
that this entire framework was disrupted.
113 COLONIALISM, supra note 75, at 17-18.
114 Id. The picture is further complicated by the notion of early Muslim caliphs being "divinely
selected rulers ... sent by God for the right ordering of worldly affairs." LAPIDUS, supra note 60,
at 74. Theoretically, despite divine selection, these caliphal powers can be undercut by intervening,
mundane authorities.
115 IBNHAzM, supra note 104, at 292.
116 Id.
117 RusHD, supra note 69, at 278.
118 2 ASAD AL-KARABISi, AL-FUROQ FT AL-FURO' [DIFFERENCES IN THE BRANCHES OF LAW] 210
(2005); SAMARQANDI, supra note 76, at 294 (noting that the duty of care to one's parents is
automatically reinstated if thejihad-duty begins to be adequately fulfilled).
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V. COLONIALISM'S ENDURING LEGACY
As shown above, pre-modem jurists considered use of violence
generally to be the exclusive right of the state. The primary exception was when
a territory faced imminent attack or invasion. At those points, the state's
jurisdiction over jihad was temporarily suspended. Broadly speaking, European
colonialism represents the starkest example in Islamic history of conditions that
suspend the state's authority over the jihad-duty. Colonialism contributed to the
dispersal of the state's powers among non-state actors, particularly religious and
tribal groups, resisting foreign invaders. This authority included not only the
ability to gather forces, but also the right to determine when to engage in armed
conflict. The disruptive effect of colonial rule transitioned the jihad-duty from
its classical representation to its modem reformulation.
However, despite this disruption and eventual transition, my contention
is that a classical organizing structure, real or imagined, for waging jihad was
deeply embedded in resisting populations. Even in a decentralized pre-modem
state, authority over the jihad-duty resided with the center: the ruler or imam.
This remained the case for the majority of Islamic history, arguably up through
the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century. However, as early as
the late 18th century, parts of the authority over jihad began to change with the
invasion of colonial powers. The "rise and expansion of Western industrial
capitalism" in the 19th and 20th centuries led to most Muslim populations being
"subjected to Western colonial rule."' 9 European rule over Muslim populations
expanded and "forever changed all aspects of geography, the economy, social
relations and politics in the areas that it ruled." 20 In particular, as colonial and
local elites negotiated their relationship, Islamic law went through a process of
codification that limited it to "areas of personal and family law," depriving it of
a role in military matters.' 21 Background on this critical period of colonization is
crucial to understanding the break from the classical political framework for
regulating jihad and why it has not been rectified.
Despite the break from the existing political order in many countries,
"the doctrine ofjihad was of paramount importance" in the resistance to colonial
rule. 122 In response to colonial rule, fragmented groups of societal actors lifted
the banner of jihad in place of the Muslim state. Local populations organized
119 COLONIALISM, supra note 75, at 39.
120 S.V.R. Nast, European Colonialism and the Emergence ofMuslim States, in THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF ISLAM 552 (John L. Esposito ed., 1999).
121 IZA R. HusslN, THE POLITICS OF ISLAMiC LAW: LOCAL ELITES, COLONIAL AUTHORITY, AND
THE MAKNG OF THE MUSLIM STATE 10 (2016). For many scholars, the changes colonialism brought
to Islamic law represent a "significant departure from the instance-based, judge-centered, and often
diverse applications of Islamic law." Id.
122 COLONIALISM, supra note 75, at 41 (emphasis added).
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themselves into politico-religious movements to fight foreign rule.12 3 Arguably
the most determined resistance occurred in Sudan, Somaliland, Libya and
Morocco.1 2 4 In each of these countries, religious leaders were at the forefront of
the resistance, often giving it "cohesion" through the organizational structures
they already had in place.1 25 This was indicative of the centrality of political
authority injihad's administration; these movements formed quasi-states to carry
out their resistance.
The formation of these quasi-states connected to another area of classical
Islamic law: the obligation to migrate (hijra).'2 6 In the medieval period, when a
Muslim territory came under a foreign invader's control, the land went from
being Islamic to disputed. In these cases, many jurists required people to migrate
to the nearest territory under Muslim sovereignty.1 2 7 There is an intimate
connection between the obligation to migrate and the duty to fight because the
former often serves as a precursor to the latter.1 2 8 My research suggests that, in
the colonial context, many resistance movements would separate themselves
from the territory under colonial rule in order to establish their own writ before
continuing their fight. This allowed them the opportunity to not only unify
various factions, but to replicate the political structure that governed them prior
to colonial rule. 12 9 The historical record also shows that other movements simply
utilized pre-existing hierarchical networks and infused them with political
functions to recreate state authority. Any subsequent jihad against foreign
occupiers was guided by these new authorities.
For example, in Algeria, the Sufi brotherhoods, or turuq, had "the
organizational framework necessary for waging a struggle" and eventually
formed a "large confederation of tribes" to fight the French pledging allegiance
123 Id. at 39.
124 7 C.C. Stewart, Islam, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AFRICA 195 (J.D. Fage et al. eds.,
1986).
125 7 Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, French Black Africa, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
AFRICA 331 (J.D. Fage et al. eds., 1986).
126 For a more detailed discussion, see generally Masud, supra note 105, at 29-49.
127 In the colonial period, both CAbd al-Qldir in Algeria and Usman dan Fodio in Nigeria "wrote
about the need for Muslims to migrate (hijra) from regions under the military occupation or
political control of 'unbelievers' and also about the necessity ofa 'holy war' (fihoid) against them."
B.G. MARTIN, MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AFRICA 36 (1976).
128 This is arguably true from the very first migrations in Islamic history, in particular when
Muhammad moved his followers from Mecca to Yathrib (later Medina). It was only after the move
and subsequent formation of a state that Muhammad began pursuing any militaristic ventures. For
a more elaborate discussion of this point, see JAVED AHMAD GHAMIDI, MIZAN [THE BALANCE] 592-
99 (6th ed. 2012).
129 Of course, the level of external governance Muslim territories received prior to colonialism
was not uniform. In some territories, a central authority played a prominent role while in others it
was relatively absent.
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to one leader.' 3 0 This leader began carrying out functions normally reserved for
a state: forming an army, collecting taxes, and appointing representatives
throughout the territory. 13 ' In Libya, the Sanisiyyah order, a Sufi brotherhood
established in Cyrenaica in the 1840s, gathered the tribes in opposition to the
European state. 132 Together they formed a state-like structure that performed
"typical governmental functions," including educating the populace,
administering justice, and maintaining public security.' 3 3 On the other hand, in
India, opposition to the British eventually developed into armed resistance and
the "doctrine of jihad played a significant part [] ... [with] [t]he most important
[] movement[] [being] TarTqa-i Muhammad... ." 3 Their strategy was to
occupy "territory out of reach of the British" in order to "establish a righteous
Islamic government that could conduct the struggle for the liberation of India."l 35
130 COLONIALISM, supra note 75, at 54. Sufi brotherhoods were communities based on doctrines
and rituals intended to develop the "spiritual" side of Islam. Id. at 116. They emerged in the 12th
and 13th centuries but evolved into "exclusive religious communities" in the middle of the 18th
century. JAMIL M. ABUN-NASR, MUSLIM COMMUNITIES OF GRACE: THE SUFi BROTHERHOODS IN
ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS LIFE 127 (2007). They had a "distinct religious rule set for it by [a] founder
and [] followers were required to pledge exclusive allegiance to his spiritual authority." Id. When
the political order "reached its lowest point in regard to unity and common purposes," it was the
Sufi brotherhood that "arose and provided a type of spiritual unity that proved in many ways to be
much more powerful even than the caliphate." FREDERICK DENNY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM
240 (4th ed. 2016).
131 COLONIALISM, supra note 75, at 54-55. The leader was CAbd al-Qadir b. Muhyi al-Din
(1808-83). In his own description, cAbd al-Qidir notes how he made sure that his deputies left
"twice a year" to collect taxes: the zakat (or charitable tax) and 'ushr (tax on production). RAPHAEL
DANZIGER, 'ABD AL-QADIR AND THE ALGERIANS: RESISTANCE TO THE FRENCH AND INTERNAL
CONSOLIDATION 190 (1977). His centralization of these activities did cause friction. Previously the
collection of taxes had been delegated to the religious brotherhoods by the central authority and
the maintenance of public security to the makhzan-tribes connected to the central Turkish
government. cAbd al-Qadir essentially usurped their role. See MARTIN, supra note 127, at 41.
132 Anna Maria Medici, Waqfs of Cyrenaica and Italian Colonialism in Libya (1911-41), in
HELD IN TRUST: WAQF IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD I (Pascale Ghazaleh ed., 2011).
133 See MARTIN, supra note 127, at 86-87. Muhammad al-Sanfisi led the brotherhood (1791-
1859). Id. at 99.
134 COLONIALISM, supra note 75, at 46.
' Id. at 48. The movement was led by Sayyid Ahmad Barelwl (1786-1831). He chose the
North West frontier area near the Afghan border but had to begin by fighting the Sikhs that ruled
there. Eventually, the organization established headquarters at Patna in North East India. Id. at 49.
Barelwi was likely inspired by his teacher Shah CAbd al-cAziz, son of the religious reformer Shah
Waliullah, whose famousfatwa from 1803 seemed to depart from a long-held consensus regarding
the British and argued that India should now be considered dar al-harb (land of conflict). Yohanan
Friedmann, Dar al-islam and dar al-harb in Modern Indian Muslim Thought, in DAR AL-
ISLAM/DAR AL-HARB: TERRITORIES, PEOPLE, IDENTITIES 352 (Giovanna Calasso and Giuliano
Lancioni eds., 2017). This was inferred from his argument that "the rulings of the imdm of the
Muslims are in actuality no longer enforced" (hukm-i-imam al-MuslimTn aylanfjarinTst) and instead
"decrees of Christian leaders" (bukm-i ru'asa' nayard) are followed "without trepidation." I SHAH
cABD AL-cAZIZ, FATAWA-E-Aztz! 16 (1905).
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In these and other examples, we find non-state actors purposefully assumed state-
like functions before they would engage in the jihad of resistance.
However, as colonial rule ended, non-state actors faced the prospect of
relinquishing their acquired authority over jihad to new Muslim states. 36 In
theory, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Muslim lands removed the
temporary justification for jihad to function as an individual obligation. Thus,
once the foreign invaders left, the classical doctrine required jihd return to its
status as a collective duty with state oversight. Hence, non-state actors had a
strong incentive to maintain the jihad-duty as an individual obligation. Their
power relative to the new state arguably hinged on their ability to retain authority
over jihad As will be shown subsequently, jurists sympathetic to this reality
assumed the task of providing justification for why jihad was still required of
every person. They resisted the state's jurisdictional claim over jihad and argued
trenchantly that, among other things, the new states were illegitimate. They
claimed these states had failed to adequately incorporate Islamic law, adopted
Western modes of governance, and allowed foreigners to continue their
hegemony over the Muslim world. It is against this backdrop that militant jurists
eventually began to reformulate classical understandings of the jihad-duty.
VI. REFORMULATION OF THE JIHAD-DUTY:
ABDALLAH YOsUF cAZZAM
(1941-1989)
This part examines how key aspects of the classical jihad-duty frame the
discussion of jihad today. More importantly, it aims to unpack how the modern
understanding of the jihad-duty departed from the earlier formulation. In order
to illustrate the continuity and evolution of the ideas surrounding the jihad-duty,
one pivotal 1984fatwd ("advisory legal opinion") will be examined. Thefatwd,
entitled "In Defense of Muslim Lands" (al-Difa2 can aradT al-muslimin), was
issued by the jurist cAbdalldh Yilsuf cAzzdm, often considered the ideological
forefather of al-Qaeda and an "inspiration" to militant movements around the
world today. 137
136 Of course, this is a broad generalization. Post-colonial Muslim states had varying
relationships with non-state actors, particularly religious scholars. State marginalization of
religious scholars was quite common either as an extension of trends that emerged during the late
Ottoman empire or due to a desire to eschew religious institutions in favor of an expressly secular
political framework.
m Andrew McGregor, 'lihad and the Rifle Alone': cAbdullah 'Azzam and the Islamist
Revolution, 23 J. CONFLICT STUD. 92, 106 (2003). Thisfatwd was introduced by the famous Saudi
cleric, Shaykh CAbd al-cAziz b. Bdz, and endorsed by many others. They considered cAzzdm
"sufficiently educated to issue a legitimate fatwd." Calvert, supra note 64, at 93. With regard to
the date of thefatwd, the earliest physical copy seems to be from 1987, but Basil Muhammad has
"credibly" argued that it was "first written in [ ] 1984." THOMAS HEGGHAMMER, JIHAD IN SAUDI
ARABIA: VIOLENCE AND PAN-ISLAMISM SINCE 1979, 41 n.6 (2010). This date has been confirmed
by Darryl Li, who provided me with a copy of thefatwd from 1984 (on file with the author).
WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW
In the fatwa, cAzzim employs a number of different techniques to make
subtle but profound changes to the classical doctrine, such as requiring practical
impossibilities and broadening the scope of narrow legal rules. His fatwa is
replete with references to pre-modem jurists, a tactic routinely used by modem
jurists to validate their own opinions. However, when he applies those legal
opinions he departs significantly from the classical doctrine. Hence, even as
cAzzam pays homage to the tradition, he initiates a paradigm shift in how jihad
is understood.
A. Background on 'Azzam and His Fatwa
cAbdallah Yilsuf Mustafa cAzzam is considered by many to be the "first
modem ideologue of transnational jihid."'13 Most of his predecessors who wrote
on jihad confined their militant ideology to "struggles against their respective
governments."1 3 9 While he himself "never advocated international terrorism,"
his ideas have inspired "foreign fighter activism to this day." 4 0 For many, he
was the "critical force both ideologically and organizationally for the recruitment
of thousands of Muslims from around the world" to engage injihad against the
Soviets.141 Some have argued that he was a "mentor" to Osama bin Laden and
his "first and most important . .. father figure." 4 2
cAzzim was born in 1941 in the village of Silat al-HIirthlyah, northwest
of Jenin, in pre-Mandate Palestine.1 43 After 1948, the village found itself on the
border with Israel; "[1]ife on the border with the enemy [] bec[a]me a recurrent
theme in cAzzim's life."'" He nominally participated in the Six Day War, and
in 1969 fled with his immediate family to Jordan as a refugee. 45 This seems to
have been when he began to "seriously consider taking up arms" as a tactic of
138 Thomas Hegghammer, 'Abdallah 'Azzam and Palestine, WELT DES ISLAMS 354, 354 (2013)
[hereinafter Azzdm and Palestine].
139 Id.
140 Id. at 355; see Calvert, supra note 64, at 85 ("arguably did more than any other person to
create the theoretical underpinnings of the contemporary Jihadist movement").
141 PETER BERGEN, THE LONGEST WAR: THE ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN AMERICA AND AL-
QAEDA 13 (2011).
142 Id.
143 Azzam and Palestine, supra note 138, at 359. He was born in the neighborhood of Harat al-
Shawahina to a family that owned some land and was marginally better off than the average village
resident. Id. at 360. The village itself had about 1,800 inhabitants at the time, primarily farmers,
and the closest town, Jenin, was not much larger, with a population of 4,000. Id. at 359. The area
itself, the northern West Bank, is historically known for its "political activism and resistance to
foreign occupation," such as fighting Napoleon, the Ottomans, the British and Israelis. Id.
14 Id. at 364.
145 Id. at 366-67.
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resistance. 4 6 From February, 1969 to September, 1970, he spent time with the
Fedayeen ("self-sacrificers")1 47 in Jordan, participating in combat operations
against the Israeli military.1 48 They set up four training camps, which would
receive visitors from all over the world, including some who became prominent
Islamist leaders elsewhere, particularly with the Muslim Brotherhood. 149 Prior to
this, cAzzdm received a B.A. in theology from Damascus University in 1966 and,
in 1973, earned a doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence from al-Azhar University in
Cairo.150 For a period of time, he taught Islamic studies at various universities in
the Muslim world until he resigned his post at the Islamic University of
Islamabad in 1984 and took up residence in the Pakistani border town of
Peshawar, an epicenter of activity in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet
Union. '' That same year, he partnered with Osama bin Laden to establish the
Office of Fighter Services (Maktab Khadamat al-Mujahidin), a charity that
provided various services to fighters, raised donations for the cause, and found
new recruits.15 2 On November 24, 1989, a bomb was planted along the path that
cAzzim took to Friday congregational prayers. 153 It detonated as his car drove
by, killing him, his two sons, and another passenger.' 5 4 After cAzzlm's death,'
the Office of Fighter Services faded out and Bin Laden focused his energies on
a separate network he was building: al-Qaeda. 5 1
In the early 1980s, cAzzm's writings were revolutionary because they
"articulated a new jihid doctrine" that considers "liberati[on] [of] occupied
Muslim territory [to be] more important than toppling Muslim governments" and
146 Id. at 367.
147 This term generally refers to fighters in guerilla movements. MARY ELIZABETH KING, A
QUIET REVOLUTION: THE FIRST PALESTINIAN INTIFADA AND NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE 62 (2007).
148 Azzam and Palestine , supra note 138, at 369.
149 Id. at 368-69.
150 Id. at 376. It should be noted that cAzzdm never lived in Syria for any extended period. He
resided in Jenin but went to Damascus "once or twice a term for exams and other formalities." Id.
at 364. "His thesis compared Islamic rulings on divorce with those [in Jordan's and Syria's] secular
civil codes." Calvert, supra note 64, at 86.
151 Azzam and Palestine, supra note 138, at 376.
152 See AsafMaliach, Abdullah Azzam, al-Qaeda, and Hamas: Concepts ofJihadand Istishhad,
2 MIL. AND STRATEGIC AFF. 2, 79, 80 (Oct. 2010).
153 MUHAMMAD HANIFF HASSAN, THE FATHER OF JIHAD: 'ABD ALLAH 'AzzAM'S JIHAD IDEAS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 25 (2014).
154 Id.
1s5 For biographical information about cAzzdm, see Maliach, supra note 152, at 79-81;
McGregor, supra note 137, at 92; see generally HASSAN, supra note 153, at 1-25. Al-Qaeda's
formation was announced by Osama bin Laden in Peshawar in late November/early December
1989. It was based on the idea of al-Qaidah al-Sulbah ("the solid base"), which cAzzam had
outlined in an April 1988 article for the monthly magazine al-Jihad. Maliach, supra note 152, at
80.
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requires "Muslims worldwide [to engage in this] fight together."' 5 6 In essence,
he believed Muslims had a "religious duty to fight in each other's wars of
national liberation." 5 7 cAzzm'ssfatwd, "In Defense of Muslim Lands," written
during the Afghan war with the Soviet Union, centers on using proof-texts from
the Qur'an and Hadith, as well as the classical Islamic legal tradition, to
demonstrate why engaging in jihad today is not only urgent, but a legal duty
incumbent on everyone. 8` cAzzdm considers the classical literature on jihad to
be a "template capable of sustaining and directing the struggle against Islam's
enemies in the contemporary period." 5 9 His aim is to demonstrate that the jihad-
duty is no longer collective, but individual, and to delineate what this implies.' 6 0
While he avoids saying this explicitly, and may not have intended it, by shifting
the duty from collective to individual and making it globally applicable, cAzzam
promotes a process of divesting Muslim states of their broad regulatory power
over jihad. He also removes the jurisdiction of various societal actors over
specific individuals in subordinate relationships to them. Essentially, cAzzdm
transfers the authority over jihad to individual Muslims: a process others had
begun, but cAzzdm advances on a global stage. In addition, he also transfers some
authority to frontline commanders he considers best situated to appreciate the
battlefield context.1 61 Thus, in cAzzdm's framework, there is a shift away from
central jurisdiction over jihad toward local control. Each individual is now
operational and battlefield commanders are left with the responsibility for
requesting fighters and formulating military strategy.
156 Azzdm and Palestine, supra note 138, at 354-55.
157 Id. at 355. Of course, cAzzdm's connection to Palestine and its struggle may very well have
"predisposed him to transnational militancy." Id. at 358.
158 See CABDALLAH CAZZAM, AL-DIFAc CAN ARAlI! AL-MUSLIMIN: AHAMM FURIOD AL-ACYAN
[DEFENSE OF THE MUSLIM LANDS: THE FIRST OBLIGATION AFTER IMAN] 42 (Brothers in Ribatt
trans., 1987). The original Arabic version of cAzzam's fatwd was "officially" translated into
multiple languages, including English. The English translation is done by an unspecified group
referred to as "Brothers in Ribatt." While there are some problems in the translation, the general
points are adequately conveyed. As a result, I have primarily relied on the English translation and
where necessary, as a corrective, refer to the Arabic original. Note: a more accurate translation of
the fatwa title would be "In Defense of Muslim Lands: The Most Important of the Individual
Obligations."
159 Calvert, supra note 64, at 93.
160 cAzzdm was not the first modem writer to take up the issue ofjihazd as an individual
obligation. Another prominent example, published a few years before cAzzdm's fatwa, was
Muhammad cAbd al-Saldm Faraj's famous work, The Neglected Duty (al-FarTda al-Gha'iba),
which he wrote in 1981. HEGGHAMMER, supra note 137, at 41-42. However, Faraj's work and
similar ones did not have the transnational character of cAzzam's fatwd; they were primarily
focused on their own national context.
161 See cAzzAM, supra note 158, at 35.
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B. Interpretive Techniques
cAzzam's fatwd has one primary goal: to activate every Muslim as a
potential fighter while delegitimizing the authority of the state, or, more
specifically, those states he dislikes. In order to do this, he employs four main
interpretive techniques. First, he broadens the scope of legal rules so that they
have universal application. Second, he requires performance of acts that are
practical impossibilities. Third, he makes certain classical legal rules functional
when in fact they were meant to be aspirational. Finally, he makes conditional
rules automatically applicable. The end result is a weak central state and
individuals empowered to function like mini-states.
1. Broadening Particular Rules to Apply Universally
cAzzam employs an interesting maneuver when putting a classical legal
rule into practice: he adjusts its scope to give it universal application. In other
words, even when a rule is meant to operate within certain confines, cAzzdm
broadens its application. For instance, he speaks of the jihad-duty in two types
of military contexts: offensive actions and defensive responses to provocation.1 6 2
cAzzdm assigns offensive jihad exclusively to the category of collective duties
and defensive jihd exclusively to individual obligations.' 63 In contrast,
premodern jurists discussed both offensive and defensive contexts, but did not
assign any one legal duty to them. The nature of the legal duty was not fixed for
everyone in a particular military context; rather, the duty adjusted for individuals
and communities based on how they were situated in relation to the conflict.
Classically, the individual obligation only attached to residents of the town under
attack; for everyone else it remained a collective duty. However, cAzzam is not
concerned with who performs the duty; his defensive jihd triggers an individual
obligation not only for residents of a besieged town, but universally as well.
cAzzdm wants a limited role for the collective version of the jihad-duty and
therefore restricts it to offensive contexts.' 64
cAzzdm's strategy is to argue that the individual duty to fight is not
limited to the besieged local community. He applies the rules activated for
besieged residents of a town to the global Muslim community. In other words,
every Muslim, regardless of where they are, is required to engage as a solitary
unit, with each of them equally vested in the battle regardless of how they are
162 Id.
163 Id. at 15.
164 Id. at 14. In this scenario, cAzzlm notes a few minimum requirements necessary to satisfy
the duty: guards patrolling the border and engaging in an annual show of force by invading enemy
territory. Id.
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situated. 165 This is a significant departure from how the classical doctrine applied
legal rules. Pre-modern jurists never assumed universal application but instead
created different legal duties based on proximity to the area of hostility. 66 For
cAzzdm, universal application is necessary because the alternative is for the
jihad-duty to stay collective and the state's authority to remain itact.
cAzzdm expands the individual obligation's application beyond the area
of conflict and has it move out in "[concentric] circles from the nearest [group]
to the next nearest" until the besieged territory is successfully retaken.' 6 7 He
contends that this process of expanding the obligation continues until jihad
"becomes [an individual obligation] on the whole world," arguing that this is the
view of pre-modern jurists like Ibn Taymiyya and the four Sunni schools of legal
thought.1 6 8 This notion of an individual obligation expanding in concentric
circles to include other groups aligns with the pre-modern view, but with
significant caveats. For instance, cAzzam seemingly leaves no room for a
situation where the Muslim state, under whose jurisdiction the afflicted territory
falls, might reach peaceful terms with the invaders. He does not acknowledge the
state's authority to do this because he activates the individual obligation for
everyone without any oversight. In addition, the pre-modern doctrine requires
the besieged population or the head of state issue an appeal for help before an
individual obligation is initiated for the next nearest group.1 6 9 There is no notion
in the pre-modern doctrine that individuals march off to war on their own behest
when their services have not explicitly been requested. However, this is precisely
165 There is one interesting departure in the fatwd where cAzzftm goes from speaking of the
Muslim community in universal terms to creating a "nationalistic" distinction between the
priorities of different fighting forces. He requires Arabs to first try to fight jihad in Palestine and
then, if unable to do so, set out for Afghanistan (when it was under Russian occupation). For the
rest of the Muslims, he thinks they should start in Afghanistan even though he considers Palestine
the "foremost Islamic problem." But he feels there are more compelling reasons to start with
Afghanistan. One of the main ones is that the banner of a secular state has been proposed for
Palestine, while Afghanistan "flies the banner" of the declaration of faith. Id. at 23-24.
166 See, e.g., SHAYKII ZAINUDDIN MAKHDUM, TUHFAT AL-MUJAHIDIN: A HISTORICAL EPic OF
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 13 (S. Muhammad Husayn Nainar trans., 2006) (arguing that you must
fulfill the jihdd-duty unless you are traveling and satisfy the conditions for "shortening your
prayers" since travelers get special allowances under Islamic law). I am grateful to Fahad Bishara
for pointing me to this treatise.
167 cAZZAM, supra note 158, at 15. Interestingly enough, the same juristic framework is laid out
in CAzzlm's Ayat al-Rahmanftjihadal-Afghdn, but he does not apply the individual obligation to
all Muslims. Instead, he argues that they must work in "their own countries to establish the law of
God." In other words, he does not seem to extend the concentric circles at this time even though
this piece was written just a year prior in 1983. cABDALLAH cAzzAM, AYAT AL-RAHMAN Ft JIHAD
AL-AFGHAN [SIGNS OF THE MERCIFUL IN THE JIHAD OF THE AFGHANS] 165 (1985),
https://archive.org/details/waq3888 1. 1 am grateful to Darryl Li for bringing this difference to my
attention.
168 cAZZAM, supra note 158, at 15-17.
169 JASSAS, supra note 94.
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what cAzzam anticipates and his reframing dispenses with the requirement for
this direct appeal. Instead, he creates an automatic appeal because a global
individual obligation is triggered whenever there is conflict.
In essence, cAzzim'sfatwd fails to consider the importance of proximity
in determining the type of legal duty that an individual has in an armed conflict.
His governing assumption is that at least some corner of the world is facing a
failed Muslim military effort against an enemy. As a result, the duty to fight is
perpetually triggered for everyone: not temporarily, but permanently. He makes
no distinction between the obligation for those on the frontlines and those
thousands of miles away; they are equally responsible for fulfilling the duty. In
this vein, he quotes a hypothetical interlocutor as saying that "[w]e already know
that jihad with your person today is [an individual obligation] and that jihad is
now obligatory like prayer and fasting ... ."170 Even the hypothetical question
he seeks to answer assumesjihad functions as a permanent individual obligation.
There are no qualifiers with regard to circumstances or proximity to the conflict.
In brief, cAzzm is implying that if jihad is individually obligated on a Muslim
anywhere, it is also individually obligated on Muslims everywhere. For pre-
modern jurists, it would be untenable to expect someone halfway across the globe,
to be both informed about the conflict in Afghanistan and be expected to
perpetually join the frontlines of every conflict involving Muslims. Yet this is
precisely how cAzzdm constructs the legal duty. When confronted with the
logical impossibility of this construction, he offers only an emotional lament over
how different Muslim fortunes would be if they could mobilize the masses to
their frontlines.' 7 1 He is invested in contemporary Muslims thinking of
themselves globally.1 7 2 However, much of Islamic law is configured to account
for the local, not the global, when developing legal rules.1 7 3
2. Requiring Practical Impossibility to Delegitimize the State
Similarly, cAzzm also attempts to delegitimize the state's authority
through his advocacy of practical impossibilities. These are legal rules that may
possibly have been operative in the pre-modern period but are impossible to
implement today without catastrophic results. One example is the pre-modern
requirement to wage jihad annually. Pursuit of yearly jihad is an untenable
proposition in modern times with international agreements and a different notion
of sovereignty. Any Muslim nation that preemptively disregards its treaty
obligations would violate both international law and Islamic law. However,
cAzzam requires this annual jihad regardless of the circumstances. This allows
170 cAzzAM, supra note 158, at 33 (emphasis added).
171 See id. at 3 6-41.
172 Id.
173 See id. at 36.
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him to claim that any state failing to pursue jihad every year is guilty of sin and
people are not required to obey the orders of a sinful state. 17 4 This is also a
misstatement of the majority view of pre-modem doctrine that even impious
rulers deserve obedience. " However, for cAzzdm, when the state prohibits you
from engaging in jihad, not only are you not required to obey it, but the state is
sinning by preventing you from performing an individual obligation. 7 6 This
argument almost seems to be preparing the individual to carry on jihad against
their own sinful state after they have answered the call in Afghanistan.
cAzzam's suggestion that the obligation to fight persists "as long as any
[tract of] land that was Islamic [remains] in the hands" of disbelievers is an even
starker example of practical impossibility. '7 7 In other words, not only is he
advocating for the liberation of Muslim territory presently under attack, but also
for the liberation of all Muslim territory that has ever been attacked. This framing
can only promote a posture of perpetual warfare requiring retaking territory, such
as the past Islamic empire in al-Andalus, now an integral part of Spain. The
obligation to recapture all territory previously under Muslim control is absent
from pre-modem Islamic treatises. In fact, the position does not even seem to be
adopted by jurists during the 13th century Mongol conquest of the Muslim world.
There is no indication from the writings of jurists living during that period,
including Ibn Taymiyya, that jihad remained an individual obligation until the
Mongols were expelled from every tract of land that at some point was under
Muslim political authority. It would have been a practical impossibility.
3. Ignoring Pre-Conditions
cAzzam's fatwd also makes other subtle changes to the classical juristic
position by glossing over certain points or expanding particular definitions. Like
174 See id. at 14.
175 See generally N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 133 (Edinburgh Univ. Press
1964). Khaled Abou El Fadl provides a more nuanced picture of what was going on in the pre-
modem period regarding this obedience. He shows that there were both obedience and "counter-
obedience" traditions as some jurists struggled with requiring absolute obedience to the ruler.
KHALED ABou EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW 118-31 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2001).
76 See cAzzAM, supra note 158, at 35. Interestingly, cAzzdm also expands the end goals of
jihad that lead to the logical conclusion that there will be perpetual warfare. He notes up front that
jihad is not only "[propagation by] force" but also obligatory to perform until only "people who
submit to Islam" remain. Id. at 14.
17 Id. at 23 (emphasis added) (ay buq'a kanat islamTya). This also comes up in another
famousfatwi of his, entitled Join the Caravan (lhaq bi'l-Qdfila). cABDALLAH cAzzA.M, ILHAQ
BI'L-QAFILA (JOIN THE CARAVAN) 10,
https://archive.org/stream/JoinTheCaravan/JoinTheCaravan-djvu.txt (last visited Nov. 4, 2017)
("The sin is not lifted off the necks of the Muslims as long as any area of land (which was once
Muslim) remains in the hands of the Disbelievers, and none are saved from the sin except those
who perform jihad.").
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pre-modem jurists, cAzzam notes that the individual jihad obligation is
automatically triggered by four conditions: non-believers entering Muslim land,
an army advancing when two sides meet, the ruler commanding a specific person
to march, and enemies "captur[ing] or imprison[ing] a group of Muslims."17 8
For the most part, this position is in line with the classical opinion,
though there is disagreement as to whether the mere capture of Muslims would
trigger the obligation. cAzzam glosses over any difference of opinion here even
though pre-modem jurists were far more reluctant to create circumstances that
would even temporarily negate the state's authority or allow autonomous
decision-making on questions of war. 179 cAzzdm's articulation of the details of
these conditions is where he creates some distance between his understanding
and that of the pre-modem jurists. For instance, he speaks of non-Muslims as
though they are always in a posture of hostility to the Muslim state. 80 Thus,
"invasion" acquires a far broader meaning than it did in the classical period
where it referred only to military confrontation.is8
4. Reading Functional Rules into Aspirational Suggestions
cAzzam's reasoning on the annual jihad exemplifies a consistent
problem that occurs in the interpretation of pre-modem Islamic jurisprudence.
Contemporary jurists often broadly apply a legal rule that is meant to be
operational only in particular contexts. In addition, they often read all classical
juristic statements as moral prescriptions as opposed to aspirational suggestions.
As Khaled Abou El Fadl points out, at times jurists may believe they are
articulating an "actual social or political practice" from the classical period, but
in reality, the pre-modern discourse is simply "aspirational in nature."' 82 Hence,
in the case of yearly jihad, Abou El Fadl argues that a misreading or change in
the context in which the jurist's statement was made might mean that the
functional rule is actually aspirational.183 Had it been a moral prescription then
it would persist regardless of circumstance.' 84
cAzzam leaves no room for the possibility of aspirational rules: every
rule is functional for him. As a result, he takes the jurists literally, not
178 CAzzAM, supra note 158, at 14-15.
179 Id. at 45-49. Even his own ideological forefather, cAbd al-Salfm Faraj, does not mention
the fourth condition in his famous treatise on the jihild-duty. See MUHAMMAD cABDUS SALAM
FARAJ, AL-JIHAD: AL-FARIDA AL-GHA'IBA [JIHAD: THE ABSENT OBLIGATION] 60-61 (1981).
180 cAzzAM, supra note 158, at 39.
181 Id. at 37.
182 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Between Functionalism and Morality: The Juristic Debates on the
Conduct of War, in ISLAMIC ETHICS OF LIFE: ABORTION, WAR, AND EUTHANASIA 103 (Jonathan E.
Brockopp ed., 2003).
183 Id. at 103.
184 Id. at 104.
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appreciating that they may have intended a more figurative meaning. The
category of collective duties as a whole is a good example of this distinction
between functional and aspirational rules. For instance, pre-modern jurists
expanded the category of collective duties to include various crafts and trades
that they deemed necessary for society.' 8 5 However, their writings implied that
these were aspirational obligations. They wanted to encourage these skills in
society but were not interested in holding people morally liable for learning them.
C. Undermining Authorities: State and Status-Based
Most importantly, cAzzdm's fatwd undermines entities that classically
had regulatory authority overihad, namely the state and certain societal actors.
Transforming the jihad-duty to essentially a permanent state of individual
obligation leads to this undermining. This is because there is universal
agreement, among classical and contemporary jurists, that individual obligations
do not require permission from any authority before performance.' 8 6 For cAzzdm,
as long as the duty is individual, the state's regulatory authority remains
suspended. In fact, he argues, with surprisingly little hesitation, that even the
Prophet Muhammad's permission would not be necessary when the jihad-duty
is individualized.1 87 In other words, if the political authority of the Prophet is
inoperative here, then so is the authority of the modern state. Furthermore, he
contends that not only would it be impossible for "every single [person]" to seek
permission to join an expedition, but that he knows of no case in Islamic history
where someone was "punished" for participating in jihad "without
authorization."' 88
That said, cAzzdm is acutely aware of the potential chaos that might
ensue if every individual is regulating their own jihad, but he is conflicted about
empowering the state. Hence, cAzzdm proposes placing the state's regulatory
authority over jihad in the hands of local authorities, specifically "the
commander in the battle field."' 89 The commander's permission should be
acquired to avoid disrupting the organizational and military strategy. In essence,
cAzzdm is transferring the regulatory authority over jihad to entities whose
power is contingent on the immediate conflict and nothing beyond that.
185 GHAZALI, supra note 33, at 35 (expanding the category of communal duties to include
tillage, knitting, politics, cupping, tailoring, etc.).
186 cAzzlm also notes a more extreme outlier opinion from Awzlic that, even in collectivejihad,
authorization from the ruler is "only for soldiers salaried by the state." However, he does recognize
other opinions which say that joining without authorization is "a hated thing, except [in certain
circumstances]." cAzzAM, supra note 158, at 35.
187 Id. at 34.




cAzzam is not interested in permanently removing the state's authority
in this space. Rather, he only wants to do so until a more sufficiently "Islamic"
power has replaced the current forces operating in Muslim lands.' 90 As noted
earlier, it is essential to understand that while suspension of the state's regulatory
authority in certain circumstances occurred in the classical period, jurists
considered suspension temporary. Furthermore, while pre-modem jurists
permitted populations under attack to militarily engage without permission, they
were not permitted to formulate a long-term strategy of waging jihad
Hence, cAzzIm recognizes that Islamic law considers the state's
regulatory function critical to maintaining stability. Its erasure, particularly in the
context of jihd, without any indication of its reinstatement, is a disconcerting
proposition. As a result, cAzzam struggles to address the question of whether
jihad can be fought in the absence of the state. Specifically, he addresses the
question of whether jihad can be fought without the head of state.'9 1 In an odd
response, cAzzam seems to answer a different question than the one he posed.
He cites historical precedent suggesting that battles were fought where multiple
political leaders existed.1 92 Yet this does not address whether precedent exists for
fighting in the absence of any political leader. He essentially conflates two
different issues: fighting under unified rule versus fighting with no political
authority. Just as important, cAzzdm suggests that an entity can possess
regulatory authority over warfare even if it lacks political authority in other
spheres. 193 This was rarely, if ever, the case in Islamic history.1 94 In fact, he
claims that the fighting force "choose[s] their [leader] for jihad from amongst
themselves," again creating a process for military appointment that did not exist
in the past; commanders were chosen by the state not elected by the people.1 9 5
Similarly, cAzzam must account for and negate status-based authorities
that regulate jihad. Unlike the state, these social authorities have jurisdiction over
specific individuals as opposed to entire populations.' 96 The most common
examples are parents, creditors, slave masters, and male guardians.1 97 The
jurisdiction of these authorities over their subordinates is suspended in cases of
self-defense.1 98 cAzzm extends the suspension of their authority-specifically
parental authority-"until the enemy is expelled." 99 He has to address the fact
190 Id. at 24.
11 Id. at 35.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 37.
19' Id. at 38.
196 See supra Section IV.B.
'97 Id.
198 See supra Section III.B.
199 cAzZAM, supra note 158, at 28.
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that two individual obligations exist here: the obligation to fight and the
obligation to obey and care for one's parents. He gives precedence to
participation injihdd over obeying one's parents because jihdd is the "protection
of [ ] religion" while obedience to parents is "caring for the individual."2 00 This
hierarchy between individual obligations is present in the classical treatises as
well, but it is not as impactful since the jihad-duty is rarely individualized. In
cAzzdm's structure, parental authority is permanently of secondary importance
to jihad because even though they are both now individual obligations, jihad is
morally primary due to its urgency.
cAzzdm presents two analogies meant to undermine the logic of giving
parents authority over their children in these matters. First, he asks whether a son
who is a good swimmer and walks by someone drowning should be restricted
from helping that person if his father forbids it.20 1 The answer for him is
obviously no, and he places Afghanistan in the position of the drowning person
then asks how it is reasonable not to "save" it.2 02 Furthermore, he uses the
example of the drowning person because it implicates another pre-modern
collective duty: the duty to save a life, or a good Samaritan duty. Like the
example cAzzdm uses, pre-modern jurists collectively obligate individuals on the
banks of a river to save someone drowning in it.2 0 3 This only enhances the point
he is making about coming to Afghanistan's aid. Second, cAzzdm discusses the
individual obligation to pray. He notes that just as a son does not need his father's
permission to perform the dawn prayer, he does not need it to pursuejihad, which
is also a form of worship.2 04 He concludes his example by striking a sharp blow
at the authority of parents. cAzzdm says that a father who is not already engaged
in jihad when it has become individualized is a sinner.205 A son does not need
permission from a sinner to fulfill his own obligation to the faith because "how
can you seek permission from a sinner to engage in one of the obligations of
religion?" 2 0 6 As discussed previously, applying the label of sinner is also a




203 QARAFI, supra note 9, at 23; 1 BADR AL-DIN AL-ZARKASHI, AL-BAHR AL-MUHTT F USOL AL-
FIQH [THE ENVELOPING SEA OF LEGAL THEORY] 153 (1992); 4 cALT B. MUHAMMAD AL-AMIDI,
IHKAM FT USUL AL-AHKAM [THE JUDGMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF DIVINE COMMANDS] 338-39
(2003); 4 IBN AL-MUFLIH, KITAB AL-FURO'[THE BOOK ON SUBSTANTIVE LAW] 448 (2003).
204 See cAzzAM, supra note 158, at 33.
205 Id. at 29.
206 Naqesat, A bdullah Azzam -Jihad Fard Ayn or Fard Kafaayah, YOUTUBE (Apr. 20, 2013),




The shift in understanding of the jihad-duty described above has had
profound consequences not only for the legitimatization of militancy in the
Muslim world, but also for contemporary Muslim states' ability to regulate
violent behavior.20 7 While in practice many of these states are not regulating
violence on any religious basis, their population's views on permissible violence
is heavily influenced by Islamic law.208 Thus, the state's regulatory ability in this
space is directly connected to what its population believes Islamic law says, in
theory, about violence. Hence, if they perceive jihad to be a collective duty, then
it is arguably much easier for the state to regulate. As a collective duty, the state
can determine when jihad must be fought and when the duty is satisfied. The
state is also responsible for determining what the military strategy will be, the
diplomatic steps it wishes to take alongside the fighting, and when it will settle
for peace. A state can put limits on how many people engage in the collective
duty by fixing the number that would be sufficient to meet its needs and satisfy
the obligation. On the other hand, as an individual obligation, jihad severely
diminishes the state's regulatory authority, in theory, over conflicts in which it
is engaged and the participation of its citizens in conflicts elsewhere in the world.
An individual obligation requires everyone's performance. Ifjihad is a collective
duty, then a state can legitimately prevent its citizens from engaging in military
conflict by arguing that others are satisfying the duty. However, when the
obligation becomes individualized, the state risks its own legitimacy in serving
as an impediment to the fulfillment of a required religious obligation. It positions
itself as the promoter of sin and disqualifies itself as a legal authority in the eyes
of the citizenry. The overall effect is to undermine the rule of law in the state.
This transformation of the jihad-duty is unprecedented in Islamic law.
Jurists rarely re-categorize an obligatory act as individually obligated when it
was originally collective, except temporarily due to extenuating circumstances.
Only the jihad-duty has evolved in such a way as to be recast as effectively a
permanent individual obligation, regardless of the circumstances. A collective
duty allows the state to determine the parameters of "who" can participate. When
the obligation is made universal by individualizing it, the state loses its ability to
regulate participation. In the process, other powers of the state overjihad are also
undermined, in particular determining "when" and "how" participation will take
place. In other words, an individualized conception of jihad cedes decisions
relating to jus ad bellum and jus in bello to individuals. Removing the initial
authority of the state over the jihad-duty slowly unravels the entire regulatory
framework that Islamic law created for warfare.
207 By Muslim states, I am referring primarily to Muslim-majority countries, most of which
have populations deferential to Islamic legal prescriptions concerning their behavior.
208 See cAzzAM, supra note 158, at 21.
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Appreciating this transformation is essential to countering militant
recruitment. There is much discussion among policymakers about creating
counter narratives to the propaganda that militants use to convince people to
embrace their cause. 20 9 While some of these counter arguments attempt to utilize
Islamic law to criticize the behavior of militants on the battlefield, they rarely, if
ever, address the question of authority overjihad. My contention is that the very
same classical tradition that militants use to recruit fighters can, and must, be
used to undermine their efforts. The legal tradition has been effectively used to
critique militants for how they conduct war-related activities. 210 But it is seldom
used to challenge their authority to wage jihad in the first place. 2 11 Hence, the
pre-modern legal tradition should also be used to argue two key points. First,
jihad is not an individual duty by default, but a collective one. All Muslims are
not obligated to fight whenever a conflict occurs in territory under Muslim
control. Second, regulatory authority over jihad is the province of the state,
regardless of how pious its public officials may or may not be. In other words, it
is possible to formulate an argument from the classical literature that there is no
precedent in Islamic history for disparate groups of non-state actors, such as
militants, to acquire state powers over warfare. 2 12
209 See Andrew Glazzard, Losing the Plot: Narrative, Counter-Narrative and Violent
Extremism, INT'L CTR. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM - THE HAGUE 1, 3 (2017).
210 See generally id. at 3-12. Despite its flaws, one example is the Prevention Rehabilitation
and After Care (PRAC) program run in Saudi Arabia. It is designed to "combat the intellectual and
ideological tenets of violent extremism by characterizing them as deviations from Islam." It has
apparently had "significant success" with a recidivism rate of only one to two percent. The success
has led to similar efforts in Jordan, Yemen, Egypt and North Africa. See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN,
SAUDI ARABIA: NATIONAL SECURITY IN A TROUBLE REGION 52 (2009). 1 am grateful to Glen Forster
for bringing this program to my attention.
211 For instance, in an open letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, over 100 scholars
and academics outlined 24 different criticisms of his activities. One point claimed the declaration
of a caliphate was done incorrectly. None of the points related to the authority to wage jihad. See
OPEN LETTER TO AL-BAGHDADI, http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).
Similarly, the authority was not challenged in afatwa issued by 70,000 clerics in India against
ISIS, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. See Priyangi Agarwall, 70,000 Clerics Issue Fatwd Against
Terrorism, 15 Lakh Muslims Support It, TIMES INDIA (Dec. 9, 2015, 6:55 AM 1ST),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/70000-clerics-issue-fatw-against-terrorism-15-lakh-
Muslims-support-it/articleshow/50100656.cms.
212 It should be noted that some scholars have argued that acceptance of state authority in this
realm was not universal and that one of the "distinguishing features" of the scholar-ascetics in the
frontiers during the early cAbbasid period was their "indifference to and at least partial rejection of
the authority of the caliphs in the conduct of war." BONNERsupra note 50, at 6. Bonner notes that
Abi Ishaq al-Fazard came to understand "proper authority" as being present in the "religious
scholar, rather than in the delegated representatives of the imam." Id. at 19; see generally Deborah
Tor, Privatized Jihad and Public Order in the Pre-Seljuq Period: The Role of the Mutatawwi'a,
38 IRANIAN STUD. 555 (Dec. 2005). My argument does not contest this point but, rather, notes a
distinction between rejecting a particular authority and eschewing authority altogether. Even
Fazart is not advocating for the absence of all governing authority. The issue of whether a particular
[Vol. 120466
Jurisdiction over Jihad
In essence, in order to change the narrative of what is required from the
average Muslim in their engagement with global conflicts, the jihad-duty must
become collective once again. Such a shift would reconstitute the state's
jurisdiction over warfare. An initial reservation may arise over requiring largely
secular states in the Muslim world to regulate a religious duty to fight. However,
as argued above, the jihad-duty is not simply a religious obligation. 2 13 It is also
a secular one in the sense that every nation places a duty on its citizens to combat
external threats and has a monopoly on regulating this duty. As historical and
contemporary examples demonstrate, states that tolerate non-state actors
engaging in unregulated violent behavior within their territory risk
destabilization and dysfunction. While there is risk of infusing states with powers
that could be exploited in authoritarian ways, limiting the manner in which
specific states wield this power must come after placing jihd under the domain
of the state in general. This is a necessary condition for its legitimate operation
under Islamic law. 2 14
Finally, there is also an important implication here for interpreting
Islamic law in general. When reading Islamic legal texts, there is generally an
outsized focus on substantive legal rules as opposed to other areas of law, such
as procedure. To some degree, this is understandable because procedure does not
figure prominently in the texts, even though it is present in the jurisprudence that
develops around them. Still, procedure does at least get some treatment.
However, guidelines on the administration of Islamic law are often completely
ignored by modem jurists. To some degree, this makes sense as well, given the
current absence of political structures that resemble ones in which Islamic law
previously operated.2 15 However, since many Islamic legal rules have a
regulatory framework built into them, it is not possible to understand the law
without appreciating how a political authority must administer it. In several areas
of Islamic law, the administration and implementation of law is exclusively the
purview of the state. For instance, zakat, or the charitable tax, is thought of today
leader is legitimate is separate from whether the idea of political leadership is necessary. Even
rebels often had governing structures that required rebel leaders to carry out responsibilities similar
to the head of state. In fact, these rebellions were often associated with the leadership of particular
individuals, such as Ibn al-Zubayr, al-Asheath, or al-Nafs al-Zakiyya. See KHALED ABou EL FADL,
REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW 107 (2001).
213 See supra Part VI.
214 Additionally, understanding the regulatory authority over jihad also presents lessons for
why ISIS's formation of a state was a strategic calculation that allowed it to legitimately assert
certain regulatory powers while avoiding the Islamic legal critique faced by other militant groups.
While this point deserves further elaboration, it is beyond the scope of the current paper. An
important distinction exists between ISIS and other militant groups because of the former's
declaration of a caliphate. Powers that were reserved for the state can now be asserted by ISIS.
There are various arguments as to why Islamic law considers ISIS's declaration of a state to be
invalid and thus prohibits its acquisition of powers traditionally reserved for the state.
215 See supra Part III.
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as an individual's charitable giving. In fact, it is a tax collected for the operation
of the state, which included providing for the welfare of its citizens. Similarly,
criminal punishments prescribed in Islamic law cannot be carried out by any
entity lacking authority over the transgressing individual. This is part of the
social contract embedded within Islamic criminal law: only the state or its agents
can punish. Jihad is the most pertinent example of where the state's oversight is
essential.
Hence, in reading Islamic law, it is critical to account for the regulatory
framework built into it or otherwise risk misunderstanding how the substantive
law is meant to function in practice. This regulatory reading bridges the gap
between the theoretical rule and its application. When it is not accounted for,
legal inconsistencies arise as laws are implemented without considering the
limitations placed on their application. In many cases this manifests in
individuals taking the law into their own hands. Once empowered in the jihad
context, they begin to usurp the authority of the state in other arenas. Criminal
law is the most glaring example of this with numerous instances of individuals
believing they have the right, arguably an individual duty, to carry out criminal
punishment, including extra-judicial application of the death penalty. 2 16 in
essence then, this discussion shows the important role of the state within Islamic
law by recognizing that law is not only substantive rules, but also the guidelines
in place to administer those rules.
There is need to rectify the disruption in the 20th century that occurred
in the understanding of Islamic law's duty to fight. The state needs to be
reconstituted as the only authority regulating violence in Islamic law. Any acts
of violence, by individuals and non-state actors, outside at least a functionally
state-like authority, cannot be considered legitimate. An essential first step to
achieving this paradigm shift is returning jihad to the domain of the collective.
216 For potent examples of this with blasphemy laws, see generally DARARA TIMOTEWOS GUBO,
BLASPHEMY AND DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS IN A POLARIZED WORLD 44-45 (2014); ANN
ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 164-65 (1999); and ERIC
PATTERSON, POLITICS IN A RELIGIOUS WORLD: BUILDING A RELIGIOUS LITERATE U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 1-2 (2011) ("If the law punishes someone for blasphemy, and that person is pardoned, then
we will also take the law in our hands."). I hope to discuss this issue further in a forthcoming piece.
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